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The UNDP estimates that 526,000 people die each year as a result of violent 
conflict, making conflict deterrence a top priority for the international 
community.  Immediately following a major conflict, countries that stagnate 
in economic growth have a 40% risk of conflict recurrence, yet those who 
successfully maintain high economic growth see their risk reduced to 25%.  
Due to this, stimulating growth should be a top priority in any economic 
reconstruction model.  This paper aims to measure the effectiveness and 
efficiency of selected stimulants of economic growth: foreign direct 
investment, trade and financial liberalization, developmental assistance, and 
humanitarian aid.  The subsequent macroeconomic responses are evaluated 
throughout the sample of 30 conflicts terminated between 1989 and 2014.  
This paper also explores the social and economic impacts of conflict and 
violence and develops a new indicator, the Human Capital Loss index, to 
quantify conflict intensity levels within the sample.  Post-conflict countries 
require strong surges of investment, aid, and debt relief immediately 
following war, and those in the low income country (LIC) grouping require 
substantially greater efforts on the part of the international community to 
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Summary Findings                                                 
               (Only Statistically Significant *** Are Listed) 
 Conflict death totals, direct and indirect, are inconsistent or incomplete across 
all external data sources.  This necessitates multiple source reporting and 
estimation. The Human Capital Loss Index is developed in this paper to 
quantify relative conflict intensity.  
 Conflicts that experience higher degrees of human capital loss see faster 
recovery rates as measured by increases in access to electricity and water, 
human development index (HDI) value, and growth of GDP per capita.  
 GDP growth during reconstruction in post-conflict countries is positively 
correlated with trade openness and negatively correlated with financial 
openness across the sample of post-conflict income groupings (Low, Lower 
Middle, Upper Middle )(LICs, LMICs, and UMICs).  
 GDP growth is positively correlated with foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
UMICs and with natural resource consumption in both LICs and UMICs. 
 Income inequality (GINI) in LICs is increased by explanatory variables: GDP 
growth, government expenditure, and trade openness; while FDI and official 
development assistance (ODA) decrease income inequality across the sample.  
 Massive spikes of ODA immediately post-conflict likely create lasting market 
distortions as reflected in sharp increases in real effective exchange rates. 
 During the first five years of economic reconstruction, initial imports surge, and 
after export industries reconstitute from conflict, average trade balance returns 
by End of Conflict (E) +5.  
 Half the sample demonstrates humanitarian aid-dependence as defined by 
maintaining a >5% allocation of total ODA by E+10; this is assessed to be due 
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Methodological note on this study:  
To compile a sample of conflicts from such diverse countries presents extraordinary challenges.  
First, conflict itself must be defined, which in itself is highly subject to debate in the literature.  
One’s definition of conflict logically leads to the selection criteria in a given study, i.e. the 
parameters or coding of sample inclusion.  Therefore, empirical results are highly dependent 
upon this initial process of selection.  Not being methodical regarding the defining of conflict 
creates a random, highly heterogeneous sample that will skew econometric analysis; 
unfortunately, this has become a common-place practice observable in many studies as 
identified by Gersovitz and Kriger (2013).  The concordance and goodness of fit of my sample, 
which demonstrates similar reconstruction patterns across the majority, provides a vital step in 
future conflict analyses. Regardless of time and economic composition differences, the 
macroeconomic effects of conflict are highly measurable and comparable globally.    
In order to arrive at the stage of evaluating international aid effectiveness (Section III) and 
economic stimulants that produce growth and inequality (Section II), relative intensity of each 
conflict was required to be measured.  However, quantitative measures of real conflict intensity 
are currently deficient in conflict analysis literature.  The majority of economists have relied on 
battle-deaths as the primary measure for defining intensity levels of conflicts, yet the often-
cited Uppsala Conflict Data Program, originating from Gleditsch et al (2002), is limited in 
demonstrating economic effects of conflict.  Due to this, the Human Capital Loss Index (HCL) 
has been developed in this study to better gauge the labor force shock to an economy in the 
midst of conflict.  With HCL, results from regression analysis can be better interpreted as higher 





















This section reviews the trends in conflict analysis literature and how both conflict itself and its 
subsequently-needed reconstruction have evolved, taking on new roles.  Each recovering economy 
responds according to its own composition as well as to the degree of conflict intensity endured.  This 
section presents the methodology utilized to code and select each conflict in this study.  Finally, this 
section develops and implements a new indicator, the Human Capital Loss index, to better evaluate 
intensity levels of conflict and its economic effect as a shock to the labor force. 
 
 
Post-conflict economic reconstruction has traditionally been a breeding ground for 
scholarly papers, political science debates, economic regression models, and even 
game-theory testing.  Academians alike have theorized how economic reconstruction 
could look and should look ever since the idealistically-successful European Recovery 
Plan that pumped financial aid into the veins of the European economy and lifted its 
countries collectively from the ashes of war and into becoming industrial 
powerhouses in little more than a decade, as noted by Eichengreen et al (2000). 1  Yet 
within the past decade, a review of current literature reveals that academic interest in 
the discipline has waned, shifting priorities to more globally-minded goals.  Given 
that several countries are currently in various forms of economic reconstruction, why 
the sudden disinterest? 
Historically, the mainstream discourse on economic reconstruction maintained a 
relatively constant course from the Marshall Plan up to the 90s, primarily ascribing to 
the merits of large-scale donor funding for state-building,2 a concept completely 
appropriate within the context of clear-cut interstate wars with winners and losers.  In 
the early 2000s, academic interest saw a peak as the international community and 
numerous international organizations turned to the United Nation’s Millennium 
Developmental Goal (MDG) 8, Global Partnership for Development to answer 
lingering state-building questions such as increased volume and transparency of official 
development assistance (ODA), and the positive macroeconomic effects of trade 
liberalization.3   
1 Eichengreen, Marc, Crafts, and Hellwig (1992) “The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and 
Implications for Eastern Europe and the Former USSR.” Economic Policy, 7(14). 
2 Markovits, Daniel; Strange, Austin; Tingley, Dustin (2017) “Foreign Aid and the Status Quo: 
Evidence from Pre-Marshall Plan Aid” Harvard School of Government. 
3 According to Way, Catherine (2015) “UN’s Millennium Development Goals Report 2017”, official 
development assistance from developed countries increased by 66% in real terms between 2000 and 
2014, reaching $135.2 billion. 
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Academians alike volleyed theoretical reconstructions of destitute, war-torn economies, 
injecting various forms of stimulus, whether ODA or foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and monetary policy measures to see what effect each may have on the patient.  The 
results were confounding.  No single patient was exactly alike, and their responses were 
naturally different.  Some patients, Afghanistan for example, seemed impervious to the 
application of theorized reconstruction frameworks and still has never arrived to an 
effective post-conflict transition mainly due to lack of dynamic economic growth, 
political inclusion, and national reconciliation as Del Castillo (2008)4 acknowledges.  
These types of reconstruction efforts were seen by the international community as 
collective failures,5 and such failures may indeed be responsible for the present day 
academic fatigue in furthering reconstruction analysis.      
The principle issue, the thorn in the theorist’s side, has always been the difficulty in 
putting a theoretical framework into practice, and the failures of many one-size-fits-all 
models have proven that each reconstruction effort is unique, needing solutions to be 
applied within the context of each unique conflict.6  Economies are formed by more 
than producers and consumers; they are collections of distinct people groups as Fearon 
and Laitin (2003)7 note, collaborating, dissenting, creating, destroying, and evolving – 
a frustration shared by reconstruction practitioners alike.  Whether from topic fatigue 
or from the ever-pervasive search for breakthrough research in other fields of study, 
economic reconstruction has received little scholastic interest.8   
Another reason for waning interest may come from the changing nature of conflict 
itself.  The evolution from interstate to intrastate conflicts with unconventional, 
transnational non-state actors, embodied by the designation of international terrorism, 
ushered in a “new normal” in how we define conflict.  The once-easily identifiable 
inter-state wars with winners, losers, and peace agreements morphed into the post-cold 
war era of nebulous intrastate conflicts with greater occurrences of protracted 
4 Del Castillo, Graciana (2008) “Economic Reconstruction of War-Torn Countries: The Role of the 
International Financial Institutions” Seton Hall Law Review Vol. 38:1265. 
5 Vicenç Fisas (2009) Anuario Procesos de Paz 2009. Icaria editorial / Escola de Cultura de Pau, UAB, 
Isbn: 978-84-9888-076-2. 
6 John F.E. Ohiorhenuan and Frances Stewart (2008) highlight the importance of seeking out local 
indigenous driving factors to stimulate economic activity, and to adapt solutions to each unique 
environment and culture.  
7 Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003) “Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war” American political 
science review, 97(1), 75-90. 
8 Sambanis, Nicholas (2001) “A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative 
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insurgencies, as noted by several authors: De Long (1991),9 Gleditsch et al (2002),10 
Mack (2007).11  Although in a different form presently, conflict-affected situations 
nevertheless continue to grow; and as a further complication, an expected 60% of the 
world’s extreme poor will be living in conflict-affected situations by 2030.12  
Consequently, the new context of reconstruction has also become less clear.  Situations 
characterized by indeterminate statuses of 
security situations and unstable rule of law 
ultimately lead to greater reliance on 
humanitarian aid in lieu of developmental 
assistance as governments struggle to 
provide basic social services (further 
discussed in Section III of this study.)  
Since the Marshall Plan, the makeup of 
warfare has transitioned to a large 
majority of intrastate conflicts, and since 2000, a slight decline in major armed conflicts 
has been noted by Mack (2007).  According to the metrics published by the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP), discussed later in this section, no large-scale interstate 
armed conflicts have transpired since 2010.13   
Despite this, it would be remiss to think that the international community is trending 
towards perfect peace and harmony - far from it.  It is more likely, however, that large-
scale reconstruction efforts will be required in the near future.  Already the international 
community is on edge14 not just due to potential rogue state wars (e.g. Iran, North 
Korea) but mainly due to looming great-power wars, as conflict metrics like the 
International Crisis Group have seen intense increases in saber-rattling among the U.S., 
Russia, and China.15  Now, more than ever, the international community must anticipate 
solutions for the next major reconstructions on the horizon.  Immediate economic 
9 De Long, Bradford; Eichengreen, Barry  (1991)  “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful 
Structural Adjustment Program” National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University.  
10 Gleditsch, N. P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict 
1946–2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 39:615–37. 
11 Mack, Andrew (2007) “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline.” 
International Peace Academy. 
12 OECD, 2015 “Development Co-operation Report 2015” Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  
13 Within the historical definition of conventional interstate conflict being force on force between or 
among state actors.  Present day examples of internationalized intrastate conflicts, including the 
ongoing Syrian Civil War, cloud the definition of modern conflict but could be a catalyst to the return 
of “great-power war” once again.  See The Economist article, The Next War, Jan 27th 2018. 
14 Colucci, Lamont (2015) “Great Power Conflict: Will It Return?” World Affairs, January 2015.   







Data Source: Mack et al (2012), PRIO/UCDP  
Figure 1.1 Evolution of Conflict 1946 - 2009 
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reconstruction after a major conflict cannot be replaced by sustainable development 
efforts either.  
Although post-conflict economic reconstruction is a cross-discipline topic, its study 
nonetheless has been surprisingly compartmentalized by either highly technocratic 
macroeconomic studies or often abstract and theoretical political science journals.  Due 
to this, a large focus of this paper in particular is to create a certain hybrid analysis 
between disciplines, providing not just macroeconomic panel analysis to identify 
tendencies, but also how to correlate them with the solutions that international actors 
are currently providing.   
This study does not prescribe any one solution, but instead intends to identify 
tendencies in post-conflict economies with the aim of warning of potential future 
hazards that may not have been exhaustively considered before.  Any positive trend or 
effective policy emplaced from one country in the sample does not necessarily signify 
that it can or should be applied to another.  The grade of financial liberalization in 
Liberia, for example, should not be automatically prescribed in Chad, a relatively closed 
market, rather, each economy must be prescribed steps appropriate to their starting 
market orientations.   
With so many definitions floating about academic circles, it is crucial to clarify the term 
economic reconstruction; in this study, it is defined as:  
The sum of activities that aim to reestablish, but not necessarily replace, 
the healthy functioning of an economy where losses in physical and non-
physical capital were brought about by either war devastation or 
governmental transition as a result of a recently ceased armed conflict. 
This particular definition of economic reconstruction emphasizes two key components.  
First, by the end of any reconstruction process it is clear that restored economic 
activities will likely look different than their pre-conflict composition in general.16  This 
is a natural rebuilding process where optimizing agents re-orient to new markets as the 
business environment is transformed and different consumer preferences emerge, 
regardless of the degree of transition undertaken by the central government.  Firms 
establish new contacts, developmental aid produces lasting distortions in demand, and 
16 Ohiorhenuan, John F.E; Stewart, Frances (2008) “Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local 
Ingenuity” United Nations Development Programme. 
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unstable commodity prices and sharp rises in inflation can push even mature market 
segments into supply-side shocks.   
Second, to achieve the subjective “healthy functioning” of a given post-conflict 
economy, the length of time and grade of recovery has varied immensely among 
selected countries in this study due to each unique pre-conflict economic context.  For 
many low income countries (LICs), the context of economic reconstruction can quickly 
become blurred with sustainable development efforts due to the presiding methodology 
of international efforts. Many economies that were already dysfunctional pre-conflict, 
that is to say replete with high degrees of policy and taxation inefficiency, poor 
institutional framework, and undermining shadow economies, will require additional 
long-term resources.   
For example, Burundi rated weakest in the sample in aggregated worldwide governance 
indicators at the onset of conflict,17 and leading up to the Burundian Civil War in 
1991/1992 had seen sluggish GDP growth, and was a relatively closed economy with 
diminished trade openness of only 34.5% of GDP.18  Consequently, the country has 
traveled a difficult road in recovery, but is not seen as abnormal compared to pre-
conflict economic activity.  The healthy functioning of a recovering economy is in large 
part measured by the original level of development of the country.      
Graciana Del Castillo (2015)19 recognizes that in many instances, the act of economic 
reconstruction can also be referred to by a variety of names or as a sub-category of a 
larger operation, depending on the organization.  The United States Department of State 
generally refers to it as stabilization and reconstruction operations, while the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) utilizes peacebuilding and sustaining the 
peace as seen in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).  Bretton-Woods 
organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) utilize recovery, while various media outlets 
mention nation-building or state-building in everyday vernacular.  In general, the 
overall aims are the same; however, each naming convention reveals each 
organization’s bias towards the tools they have at their disposal.   
17 Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo (2010) "The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues" World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No.  5430. 
18 World Development Indicators (2018) World Bank Group.  Unless specified otherwise, any 
following reference to GDP related data will come from this source.  
19 Del Castillo, Graciana (2015) “Economic Reconstruction and Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries” 
Centre for Research on Peace and Development, Working Paper 25. 
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The U.S. State Department sees stabilization and reconstruction operations as a mission 
frequently linked with security forces conducting military stability operations or foreign 
internal defense, prioritizing the non-failure of a central government’s power as a means 
to prevent conflict resurgence.  Additionally, coordinated donor efforts fit within the 
framework of economic diplomacy as “resources to bolster like-minded states” as the 
U.S. National Security Strategy explains.20  The UN’s available physical asset, 
peacekeeping forces or blue helmets, is an intervention measure aimed to force a 
cessation of hostilities, protect human rights, and eventually open the door to the 
potential of conflict resolution or reconciliation.  The IMF, less occupied with security 
measures, sees the dip in performance and output of a post-conflict country as requiring 
policy measures to recover growth.   
This paper defines the period of reconstruction as immediately following the de facto, 
not de jure, cessation of hostilities, and defines the scope of analysis as the 
reconstruction of economic capacities within a conflict-affected state.  Second-order 
effects of peacekeeping or social reconciliation are not analyzed in this paper, although 
the role of economic policy as a conflict deterrent is continuously highlighted.          
A post-conflict country is not automatically designated a “fragile state,”21 even though 
both categories share perils of extreme volatility.  This is also an important point of 
clarification as economic reconstruction can be conducted across the spectrum from 
poor to rich countries and is not always conducted in destitute regions.  Numerous 
countries in this study, including Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Uganda (conflicts ending in 
2006, 2009, and 2005 respectively), underwent economic reconstruction after cessation 
of hostilities without ever receiving the World Bank’s designation “Fragile and Conflict 
Affected Situations.”  The reason is that this definition includes IDA-eligible countries 
and those that received lower than a 3.2 harmonized Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) rating or have been subject to an official international peacekeeping 
mission.22  Within this study, however, a majority of the 30 conflicts utilized (listed 
below in Table 1.1) are on the World Bank’s fragile country list.  Certainly within the 
subsequent years following conflict, post-conflict countries are highly prone to remain 
in fragile situations with weak rule of law, inefficient policy promulgation, and poor 
institutional frameworks.      
20 U.S. National Security Strategy (2017). 
21 See World Bank’s Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) for further information on the 
classification. 
22 Defined by the Global Center on Conflict, Security and Development through the World 
Development Report 2011, World Bank. 






                                                     
 




ID Country Recent Conflict Short Title* “In Conflict” Period          Conflict Type e     Termination Type*** 
   Begin End           Nominal Real 
1 Angola  Angolan Civil War 1997abcd 2002abce Internationalized Intrastate 1 3 
2 Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh War 1991abe 1994abde Intrastate 1 3 
3 Bosnia and Herz. Bosnian War 1992abde 1995abde Internationalized Intrastate 1 2 
4 Burundi Burundian Civil War 1991abce 2005c Intrastate 2 4 
5 Cambodia Cambodian War (Kampuchea) 1978ad 1991ab Internationalized Intrastate 1 1 
6 Chad Chadian Civil War 2005e 2010e Intrastate 2 2 
7 Congo, Republic  Republic of Congo Civil War 1993abce 1999abcde Internationalized Intrastate 1 2 
8 Côte d'Ivoire First Ivorian Civil War 2002ace 2007g Intrastate 2 4 
9 Croatia Croatian War of Independ. 1991a 1995bde Internationalized Intrastate 1 2 
10 El Salvador Salvadoran Civil War 1979abde 1991ae Intrastate 2 2 
11 Eritrea Eritrean-Ethiopian War 1998e 2001eg Interstate 2 4 
12 Ethiopia Eritrean-Ethiopian War 1998e 2001eg Interstate 2 4 
13 Georgia Georgian Civil War 1991abe 1994ad Intrastate 1 4 
14 Guatemala Guatemalan Civil War 1965ae 1995ae Intrastate 2 2 
15 Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau Civil War 1998abcde 1999abce Internationalized Intrastate 1 1 
16 Indonesia Free Aceh Movement 1990abe 2006a Intrastate 1 2 
17 Kosovo Kosovo Conflict 1998a 1999a Internationalized Intrastate 3 4 
18 Lebanon Lebanon War 1975abd 1990ade Internationalized Intrastate 3 4 
19 Liberia Liberian Civil War 1992ab 2003ace Intrastate 2 4 
20 Mozambique Mozambican Civil War 1976abd 1992abce Internationalized Intrastate 2 4 
21 Namibia Namibian War of Independence 1973ab 1989ab Internationalized Intrastate 1 2 
22 Nepal Nepalese Civil War 1996abe 2006ae Intrastate 2 2 
23 Nicaragua Nicaraguan Revolution 1978abd 1990abe Intrastate 1 2 
24 Papua New Guinea Bougainville Conflict 1989ae 1996ae Intrastate 2 2 
25 Rwanda Second Congo Warh 1990abcde 2001ac Internationalized Intrastate 2 2 
26 Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Civil War 1991abcde 2001abe Internationalized Intrastate 1 2 
27 Sri Lanka Sri Lankan Civil War 1983abd 2009e Intrastate 1 1 
28 Tajikistan Tajikistan Civil War 1992abde 1997abd Intrastate 2 2 
29 Timor-Leste Indonesian Occupation 1975abde 1999abde Intrastate 1 1 
30 Uganda LRA Insurgency 1979ace 2005f Internationalized Intrastate 3 4 
 
*  Recent Conflict refers to the common name of the most recently terminated conflict only.  For countries in prolonged periods of conflict, for 
example Uganda, the recent conflict title is the LRA insurgency, however, the country has been in a conflict status ever since 1979 from the 
Uganda-Tanzania War to a civil war 1980-1986, a coup d’état in 1986, the Second Congo War, and follow-on conflicts with the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA).  The end date of 2005 is marked as the beginning date of measurable economic reconstruction where deaths in the 
following years meets the threshold of 4, low activity in its territory (LRA still continued operations in the DRC however). 
** Termination type categories are adapted from the UCDP database and Kreutz, Joakim (2010) where (1) is victory, (2) is peace agreement, 
(3) is ceasefire agreement, and (4) is low activity.  “Nominal” indicates the initial satisfying of termination conditions, and “Real” indicates 
those cases where a new category superseded the previous – e.g. both Eritrea and Ethiopia signed the Algiers agreement (2) in Dec 2000 but 
continued fatalities defer to condition (4) low activity beginning in 2001 as real termination. 
 
a  Ohiorhenuan and Stewart (2008) 
b  Doyle and Sambanis (2006) 
c  Gleditsch and Lacina (2005) Uppsala / PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP) 
d  Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
e  Kreutz, Joakim (2010)    
f  Vicenç Fisas (2009).  UGANDA Specific: Vicenç recounts the emplacement of a ceasefire with the LRA while peace talks never concluded 
for several years as violence continued.  2005 is the first year that meets the battle death threshold following a ceasefire.  
g  Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) confirms first year of battle deaths number <25 following a peace agreement 
reported by UNOCI, Reuters and Associated Press in 2007. 
h  UCDP Battle-Related Deaths database records the opposing dyad to the Rwandan government as Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR) 
operating in Rwandan territory during the Second Congo War. 








Every major conflict throughout history has occurred within its own unique context.  
While certain common traits exist and economic effects share similarities, at the core 
of a conflict, each situation is unique.  The set of pre-conditions leading up to any given 
conflict, also referred to as a grievance or incompatibility by Collier and Hoeffler 
(2000),23 is a proprietary blend of social, political, religious, economic and ideological 
tensions that vary in combination, size and scope.  Conflict by its very nature is 
devastating, and economic activity will be slowed, or in some cases halted altogether, 
due to a deteriorated security situation, damaged infrastructure, migration, civilian 
casualties, closed schools, and a debilitated healthcare systems.  The context of each 
conflict then becomes essential to estimating recovery options post-conflict.  In post-
conflict analysis it is remiss to apply a quantitative regression without measuring the 
qualitative implications, which places the asterisk of immeasurable, lasting and deep-
rooted second and third-order effects.   
A prime example of country-specific recoveries is the Second Congo War (also known 
as the Great War of Africa) from 1999-2003, noted for the highly convoluted context 
in which multiple states were implicated.  This conflict presented drastic death tolls 
with both inter and intra-state clashes that ravaged infrastructure and placed generations 
and social groups throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in the midst of genocide.  On top of 
the dynamic intensity of a conflict that spanned the continent, the starting positions of 
each economy for the majority of belligerents was in the low income country (LIC) 
grouping according to the World Bank’s GDP Per Capita estimate.  The addition of a 
devastating conflict like the Second Congo War on top of an already present 
development deficit produces extremely strained economic conditions and provokes 
further challenges in future reconstruction and conflict prevention.  Therefore it is vital 
to compare post-conflict countries appropriately with others in the same income 
grouping in order to evaluate responses (e.g. Sierra Leone and Rwanda).  Likewise, 
inter-grouping analysis can be useful to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of conflict 
in general (e.g. post-conflict LICs and non-conflict LICs).  This comparison will be 
covered in Section III and will aid in establishing fundamental differences between 
economic reconstruction and “development as usual,” Del Castillo (2008).    
Previous economic reconstruction successes adapted to the market economy of their 
time, whether bolstering productive capacity in manufacturing during the European 
Recovery Plan of 1945 or adapting to the 1990s Mediterranean tourism boom as Croatia 
23 Collier, Paul; Heffler, Anke (2000) “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” World Bank Development 
Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper 2355. 
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did in 1994.  Optimizing agents, consumers and producers alike, will naturally drive 
markets towards efficiency.  An efficiency response to a crisis traverses cultural lines, 
and here the mentality of getting the job done, though each country and people group 
may define and use vastly different methods and timelines, generally exists across the 
spectrum.   
Neither consumers nor producers require perfect market conditions to maintain 
economic activity during or after a conflict.  Like water that cannot be channeled, 
economic activity chugs along even during conflicts and recessions despite negative 
outlooks.  Mankind is ingenious and always finds a way; if certain transactions become 
blocked by the governing state, activity simply slides into the illicit economy and 
continues apace.  Ohiorhenuan and Stewart (2008) recognize that “civil war does not 
destroy economic life altogether…it pushes production, trade, and commerce from the 
formal into the informal sector.”  This said, it is likely in many cases that a given 
“restoration” of economic activity post-conflict is often bringing pre-existing activity 
back into the formal sector, which, pragmatically speaking, implies having institutions 
capable enough to enforce regulation and taxation.  It is crucial that the dynamics of a 
country’s policies are taken into consideration, as will be done in Section III, in order 
to understand whether or not economic stimulants will be effective during 
reconstruction.    
In summary, there is no one-size-fits-all solution, no formulaic amount of aid, ideal 
monetary policy nor exact flow of foreign investment that can be applied across such a 
diverse sample of 30 conflict countries within a 26-year selection.  The only useful 
result in analyzing these economies and their responses is the identification of positive 
correlation trends.  From the outcome of correlation, and not causation, certain aspects 
can be highlighted - not as solutions, per se, but as potential economic guidelines that 
can be useful in steering a central government’s fiscal and monetary policy and its 
views towards protectionist barriers to include tariff regiments and capital controls.   
 
In the midst of an extremely complex problem set, as the process of modeling an 
economy often is, a macro-level approach can serve to view the forest through the trees.  
All international participants in the reconstruction playing field hold various motives 
for their inclusion and donations, but the grand majority desire to prevent conflict 
recurrence, which can utterly erase any previous progress.  The focus should always be 
placed, as it is present day, in the immediate cessation of hostilities in order to save 
lives.  This is followed by augmented peacekeeping security and should go hand-in-
hand with restoring basic services and a reestablishment of rule of law, eventually 
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renewing the “social contract” that a central seat of power has with its citizens.  Doyle 
and Sambanis (2000) found through his panel study of 124 conflicts that positive 
correlation exists between interventionism and preventing conflict recurrence through 
increasing the UN Peacekeeping forces variable, and furthered the notion that UN 
operations empower democratization processes of central governments.24   
Blattman and Miguel (2008)25 identify the pattern of economic growth as a deterrent in 
his panel data, and highlights stagnation as notably dangerous in the sense of 
heightening risk for conflict recurrence.  Figure 1.2 graphs the regression of the 
logarithm of GDP per capita on the logarithm of incidence of civil war, showing 
significant correlation between higher income gains and lasting peace in conflict 
situations.  Without entering into turbulent waters of inequality and wealth distribution, 
the empirical evidence of growth and deterrence appears well accepted throughout 
conflict analysis literature – see Collier and Hoefler (2000), Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 
2006), Ohiorhenuan and Stewart (2008), Lim (2014), Schwartz et al (2004), Gleditsch 
et al (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and 
Mack et al (2012), to name a few. 
The UNDP characterized post-conflict 
economies in terms of groupings of relative 
economic growth by “strong growth recovery” 
(SGR) or “weak growth recovery” (WGR).  
SGRs easily outpaced their counterparts by 
receiving lower probabilities of conflict 
resurgence through notable increases in GDP 
per capita growth.26  Ohiorhenuan and Stewart 
(2008) find: “post-conflict countries whose 
growth rate remains stagnant over a 10-year period following a civil war have a high 
risk (over 40 percent) of conflict recurring. If the growth rate averages 10 percent over 
the same period, the risk of renewed armed conflict is reduced to 25 percent.”  It seems 
clear then, from an analysis standpoint, that variables which more rapidly accelerate 
growth, must become essential to maintain peace.  This is the focus of the growth 
and inequality study in Section II. 
24 Doyle, M., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative 
Analysis. American Political Science Review, 94(4), 779-801.  
25 Blattman Christopher; Miguel, Edward (2008) “Civil War” Journal of Economic Literature 48 (1): 
3-57. 
26 Ohiorhenuan and Frances Stewart (2008). 
Source: Blattman and Miguel (2008) 
Figure 1.2 Income as a Conflict Deterrent 
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However, for countries in this study (Table 1.1), several recovering economies appear 
to “get stuck” in certain phases where economic activity should become restored, yet 
instead stagnates for several years.  For many cases, the majority of grievances that 
drove a country into conflict in the first place will most likely remain in the post-conflict 
setting as well.  Both incompatibilities (religious, ethnic, border disputes, etc.) and 
potential conflict accelerants (poverty, inequality, poor education, weapon 
proliferation, illicit markets, etc.) will remain as burdens that impede legitimate 
economic activity.27 These factors will always carry an innate risk of conflict recurrence 
and are therefore measured as exogenous variables in this study. 
While incompatibilities and conflict accelerants will threaten a stalling recovery, 
however, employment, though not a solution in itself, can serve as a numbing agent to 
the stinging grievance that often leads back to a recurrence of violence.  Even in post-
conflict LDCs, surging employment immediately during recovery aids in preventing 
conflict recurrence especially in areas of high youth unemployment rates.28  The most 
volatile time of a post-conflict era are the first following years, where surges in 
economic activity must take place to decrease the chances of conflict recurrence.29  
Additionally, macroeconomic policies directly affect aid absorption and market 
orientations of production sectors and can become the deciding factor in easing or 
blocking investment by foreign firms.  The reception and implementation of economic 
stimulants are paramount in economic reconstruction.   The explanatory variables, 
Trade Openness (To), Foreign Direct Investment (If), and Net ODA received per capita 
(Ifa) and their relationship on economic growth (Yg) are further explored through 
regression analysis in Table 2.4 of Section II.    
The efforts of international actors in reconstruction within the first few years of conflict 
end (E) should be prioritized to prevent conflict recurrence where possible.  USAID’s 
state building model (2009) provides a priorities list over time from E to E+10, heavily 
focused in the early years on restoration of basic services, establishing rule of law, and 
stimulating job growth artificially.  As humanitarian aid phases out, investment both 
public and private should increase, focusing on sustainable development projects in 
infrastructure and the education system.   
27 Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
28 Crocker, Chester A.; Hampson, Fen Osler; Aall, Pamela (2007) “Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict 
Management in a Divided World” United States Institute of Peace Press. 
29 USAID (2009) “A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries” Bureau for Economic 
Growth, Agriculture and Trade, US Agency for International Development. 
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In Doyle and Sambanis’ (2006)30 Peacebuilding Triangle, economic growth is 
identified in one of the variables, Local Capacities (LC).  The resiliency that a given 
country has to recover from a devastating conflict can allow fruitful peacebuilding 
efforts through restoring economic output and providing rapid employment; however, 
“local capacities” appear to be a challenging set of indicators, especially in locations 
like the Democratic Republic of Congo where extreme poverty, underdevelopment, low 
rates of electricity consumption, and sluggish economic growth require enormous 
external, international efforts to build peace.   
In the Human Security Report 2012, Mack et al (2012)31 utilized the PRIO/UCDP 
dataset and estimated that for all conflict termination types between 1950 - 2004, Peace 
had a 32.4% recurrence rate within 5 years (37 observations), Ceasefires a 38.2% 
recurrence rate (34 observations), Victory a 18.3% recurrence rate (93 observations) 
and all Other categories a 58.3% (132 observations that include indeterminate statuses, 
low fatality rates, and non-negotiated cessations).  Apart from victories, which have 
sharply declined in recent years, international intervention through peacekeeping and 
negotiated ceasefires has proved more effective in conflict recurrence than non-
negotiated Other types.  The case for interventionism and employing coordinated 
reconstruction efforts appears to remain strong.      
 
Undoubtedly, any post-conflict analysis must present upfront its pre-conceived idea of 
conflict and establish the boundaries for inclusion and exclusion of quantitative data 
analysis.  Defining conflict itself is subject to debate among academic circles, but is a 
vital foundation to begin any argument.  Specifically, armed conflict should be defined 
in light of the present day confusion given that international terrorism can blur the lines 
of once-traditional categories.  First, we begin with a definition of the state, which is a 
human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory (Weber, 1919),32  We then understand that every 
state is founded on the monopoly of force, and any subsequent contest to that monopoly 
results in the immediate friction of conflict – the violent clash between two wills, each 
30 Doyle, Michael W.; Sambanis, Nicholas, (2006), “Making War and Building Peace: United Nations 
Peace Operations.” Princeton University Press. 
31 Mack, Andrew; Mertz, Sebastian; Bui, Mai; Cooper, Tara; Echlin, Gwen; Gray, John Laidlaw; 
Harris, Kala; Ridgeway, Lindsey, (2012), “Human Security Report 2012,” Human Security Research 
Group. School for International Studies.  
32 Weber, 1919, “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society, ed. By Tony 
Waters and Dagmar Waters. Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 
Dynamics of Conflict: previous approaches 
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trying to impose itself on the other (Von Clausewitz, 1940).33  That clash varies in its 
makeup of warring parties, hereafter referred to as dyads, whether governments of state 
against each other (interstate) or a government of state against rebel groups and 
insurgencies (intrastate).   
Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, intrastate conflicts, synonymously 
referred to as internal conflicts or civil wars, have come to prominence (Del Castillo, 
2008) and have been characterized by internally-based armed participants that contest 
the central government’s monopoly of force from the inside working upwards.  Doyle 
and Sambanis (2006) define civil war as a “state against one or more opposition groups 
able to mount effective resistance…and that recruit locally, controlling some part of the 
country’s territory.”  Gersovitz and Kriger (2013)34 make the distinction that the 
“challengers” to the central authority must be numerically significant, and that they may 
seek to replace the incumbents in control of the monopoly of force or may seek to 
secede from the territory.  This definition assists in differentiating the role of a rebel 
group or insurgency, who generally desire one of these two outcomes (removing 
incumbents or territorial secession), from other generic destabilizing actors like crime 
syndicates, anarchists, or ideologically-driven international terrorism.   
Civil wars never exist within a vacuum, cut off from external dimensions of power, 
influence, or ideologies.  Rather, they are highly influenced by the international 
community and its actors.  Therefore, a simply-constructed dyad of a central 
government fighting against rebel separatists with a grievance of territory and 
secession, as in the case of the Namibia War of Independence (1973-1989), quickly can 
become complicated with external international actors arriving on scene as belligerents.  
Angola and Cuba both were directly involved in hostilities in the territory of South 
Africa,35 yet active support does not necessarily shift the conflict into an interstate as 
the root of the conflict remains centered on a local grievance against an internal 
opposition group.  In this case, civil war becomes an internationalized intrastate 
conflict (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013, Gleditsch et al 2002, Kruetz 201036), where 
intervention may occur through dyads with actors external to the territory.  Table 1.1 
lists the type of conflict as either Intrastate, Internationalized Intrastate, or Interstate.         
33 Von Clausewitz, Carl. On war. Jazzybee Verlag, 1940. 
34 Gersovitz, Mark; Kriger, Norma, (2013), What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition 
and Econometric Consequences” The World Bank Research Observer Vol. 28:159–190. 
35 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 628, (1989), 16 January 1989. 
36 Kreutz, Joakim, (2010), “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict 
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Beyond the central definition of armed conflict, the components of conflict - namely, 
commencement, intensity, and termination - also must be sharply defined and clearly 
understood as they form the context for follow-on reconstruction efforts.  However, no 
single standard exists in literature.  Rather, each conflict-related study codes data 
inclusion differently depending on the scope and objective. Across the spectrum of 
conflict, from minor civil disturbances to protracted world war, determining how to 
quantify a particular conflict’s start and end date may be the most challenging task for 
any analyst.  The deep-rooted driving factors that led to the conflict in the first place 
will likely persist beyond any cessation of hostilities, resurging violence in many cases.  
As this blurs the lines of the continuum of conflict, many economists are forced to apply 
the variable of battle-related deaths to assist in differentiating between a de jure 
cessation of hostilities and a de facto continuance of violence.  Nonetheless, Gersovitz 
and Kriger (2013) warn of the shortcut dangers of haphazardly defining conflict solely 
based off of battle deaths and not capturing the large-scale violence produced in a 
conflict and its following economic effects.            
Doyle and Sambanis (2006) code 121 civil wars, minus ongoing conflicts and cases of 
resurgence, from 1945-1999 as observations in their conflict analysis pertaining to 
effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations.  The key variables of conflict inclusion 
in their list are both human deaths and displacements whereby they categorize level of 
severity of the conflict by total battle deaths, combatants and civilians alike, and the 
displacement percentage of the population as migrants.  Previously, Sambanis (2001) 
maintained a list in their war econometrics panel study that coded a slightly broader 
definition of conflict to arrive at 124 observations over the same period of time.   
Ohiorhenuan and Stewart (2008) code 36 countries considered to be post-conflict since 
1989; this database serves as a foundational reference in this study.  In their study, 
conflict end years are conditioned through a qualitative analysis of peace milestones 
which include cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, demobilization, disarmament 
and reintegration (DDR), return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), 
rule of law and institutions, and measures of social integration and economic recovery.   
The State Failure Taskforce Report, Etsy et al (1996)37, selected 116 failure cases of 
revolutionary and ethnic wars, genocides, and disruptive regime changes.  Their study 
provided new insight on the role of democratization and the powerful role it plays 
alongside trade openness and growth to prevent state failure.       
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Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002) collaborated to create 
the Uppsala Conflict Database (UCDP) at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 
which measures conflicts worldwide by low, high, and best estimates of battle-related 
deaths annually and has become a valuable tool for many econometric studies as it 
assists in quantifying battle intensity through aggregation.  The database characterizes 
each conflict as one of three types: Minor as having at least 25 battle-related deaths in 
a given year of the period, Intermediate as having at least 25 battle-related deaths in a 
given year within a total conflict history tally of more than 1,000 deaths, and War, at 
least 1,000 battle deaths in a given year (Kreutz, 2010).  
Utilizing an adaptation of the previous methodologies listed above, this study focuses 
the population sample to the conditions listed below in Figure 1.3 for inclusion in the 
study.  As a point of clarification, only battle-related deaths (BDs) are utilized as an 
entrance condition for the observations in this study.  High BDs, greater than 1,000 
total during a conflict between two or more entities, signify the potential jeopardy to 
the monopoly of force of a government as well as imply a certain degree of weakening 
to institutions by armed opposition.  From the conflict’s conclusion by means of victory, 
peace, or ceasefires, reconstruction actions can begin to be measured holistically.  
Additionally, major armed conflicts have a tendency to produce a post-conflict 
transition whether political, social, economic, or security (Del Castillo, 2008).  For 
example, intra-communal fighting like the sectarian violence seen throughout pockets 
of Indonesia in the 1990s produced damaging economic effects, but did not necessarily 
create on its own a post-conflict transition within the state’s territory.  However, a major 
armed conflict like the Free Aceh movement in the 1990s, forced a peace treaty in 2005 
that enabled a small political transition whereby Aceh-based political parties were 
established and included in the Indonesian political system (Doyle and Sambanis, 
2006).  Therefore, utilizing direct battle-related deaths as a coding condition is 
intrinsically linked with this paper’s definition of conflict as the contestation of the 
monopoly of force.  Indirect battle-related deaths, to include deaths from famine and 
starvation, will be included in the economic model as they are by-products of a conflict, 

























Figure 1.3  Coding Conditions for Inclusion in the Sample 
 
 
1. Satisfies an armed conflict type 
 Intrastate Conflict or Internationalized Intrastate Conflict must satisfy both conditions:  
At least one side participating in hostilities must be represented by a central government, or 
dominant power holder in the case of no central government, through military forces, 
paramilitary forces, or local militias  
  
At least one side participating in hostilities as an insurgent organization must actively resist 
through force and must have established local basing in some form, whether through 
physical (not online) recruitment or participatory actions by local nationals inside the same 
territory 
  
 Interstate Conflict must satisfy condition: 
Two or more of the sides directly participating in hostilities must represent their sovereign 
governmental institutions and originate from distinct internationally-recognized territories 
and the preponderance of fatalities is between both governmental forces and not rebel 
groups, militias, or government-sponsored insurgencies. 
 
2. Satisfies existence of an incompatibility and its desired change, abolishment, or replacement: 
 Territory (1) (border disputes, cessation, or autonomy) 
  
 Government (2) (i.e. political system, representation, taxation, leadership) 
  
 Territory and Government (3) (any combination of the two)  
 
3. Satisfies one of the “Major Conflict” intensity thresholds in a given territory: 
 > 1,000 battle-related deaths occurred in any single conflict year  
  
 Cumulative sum of battle-related deaths occurred during the span of the conflict is >1,000  
 
4. Satisfies commencement threshold in a territory: 
 First year of > 100 battle-related deaths where deaths increased in the following year 
 
5. Satisfies at least one conflict termination category (1, 2, 3, 4) in a territory before 2015 where: 
 One side is internationally recognized as victor (1) with or without a following formal peace 
process or cessation of hostilities and total battle-related deaths < 25 in each subsequent year 
period for a total of three years.  
  
 A formal peace agreement (2) or formal ceasefire agreement (3) enters into force and battle-
related deaths remains < 100 for a three year period. 
  
 Low or no activity (4) marks the first year of a three year period where < 25 battle-related deaths 
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In this study, the previously mentioned PRIO Uppsala Conflict Data Program serves as 
a primary source of direct deaths in a conflict, whether battle-related or one-sided 
violence.  The analytical rigor placed by Gleditsch et al (2002) and Eck and Hultman 
(2007)38 prevented the often-inflated conflict tolls seen haphazardly quoted in open 
source media and allows conflict deaths to be validated in quantitative studies.  The 
negative aspect of using stringent coding guidelines is that if a conflict-ridden country 
lacks telecommunications infrastructure or is a highly closed economy, lack of 
information to serve as validating references produces astonishingly low conflict death 
estimates in some of the poorest countries.   
An immediate example of this disparity is evident in Table 1.2 where the UCDP One-
Sided Deaths for Rwanda records the Tutsi genocide by state-sponsored Hutu militias 
with over 800,000 killings; however, during the Mozambique civil war only 1,638 one-
sided deaths are recorded during the 17-year civil war, yet extrajudicial state-sponsored 
killings against suspected RELIMO supporters were frequently reported by human 
rights watchdogs.39,40  Gleditsch et al (2002) recognizes that holding to a state-based, 
organized counting requirement produces an “enduring controversy” over the database 
as it cannot account for indirect deaths caused by famine, disease or deaths from intra-
communal fighting.  Lacking this information in battle death estimates becomes even 
more significant in certain conflicts as seen in the Cambodian Civil War between the 
Kampuchea and the Kingdom of Cambodia, where it was discovered that the infamous 
“killing fields” held a large number of the estimated 1.7 million41,42 Cambodians that 
were executed or had died from disease or starvation.43  Since these figures do not meet 
the state actor condition, they cannot be tallied in the UCDP dataset.  
To bridge this vital death toll statistic between direct and indirect conflict-related 
deaths, Table 1.1 provides a box of direct death categories from the UCDP database 
38 Eck, Kristine; Hultman, Lisa, (2007), “Violence Against Civilians in War,” Journal of Peace 
Research 44. 
39 Human Rights Watch, (1992), “Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine, and the Reform Process in 
Mozambique,” Africa Watch Report.  HCR. 
40 Liga Moçambicana Dos Direitos Humanos, (2003) “Torturas, tratamento degradante e execuções 
sumárias,” IESE.  
41 Leitenberg, Milton, (2006) recounts an estimate of 1.79 million civilians through his personal 
archives. 
42 UNESCO, (2007) “Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in 
South-East Asia” references 1.7 million deaths by the Khmer Rouge. 
43 Human Rights Watch, (2009) “Cambodia: 30 Years After Fall of the Khmer Rouge, Justice Still 
Elusive” January 5, 2009, citing the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia. 
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next to the box of additional sources that estimate both direct and indirect fatalities. 
Each column is averaged between UCDP and an additional source and compiled as the 
total adjusted conflict death variable, Tot_Adj_Con_Dth.  The majority of the sample 
received large increases in death total through multiple sourcing; however 7 of the 30 
observations’ Tot_Adj_Con_Dth are lower than the original UCDP direct deaths 
estimate.   
By basing death totals in confirmed battle deaths, often-highly inflated indirect deaths 
can be prevented from heavily skewing the totals in each country.  The generally 
recognized problem with using indirect deaths in estimations is that widespread famine 
and disease, while exacerbated by war, is not the sole by-product of conflict.  
Consequently, underdeveloped countries have the tendency to see far greater indirect 
death tolls attributed to conflict, although attributable causation tends to be weak.  As 
conflict estimate data tend to be imprecise in general, this approach to aggregate such 
data is admittedly not definitive, but it does provide a stop-gap estimate from multiple 
sources in order to have a starting point for analysis until more robust databases can be 
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1 Angola 6 16,256,651 6,587 30,218 36,805b   
 
100,000d 68,400 0.42% 
2 Azerbaijan 4 7,436,250 763 4,880 5,643b   10,000 10,000d 8,200 0.11% 
3 Bosnia 4 4,029,920 14,026 13,457 27,483b   
 
101,000e 64,200 1.59% 
4 Burundi 15 6,312,247 21,605 8,247 29,852b 200,000 
 
200,00d 119,100 1.89% 
5 Cambodia 14 7,710,586   136,000 136,000b 1,790,000 75,000 1,865,000d 1,895,500 24.58% 
6 Chad 6 10,964,694 27,113 2,583 29,696b   
 
7,000f 18,300 0.17% 
7 Republic of Congo 7 2,885,250 3,422 14,123 17,545b   
 
20,000g 18,800 0.65% 
8 Côte d'Ivoire 6 18,194,215 731 810l 1,541b   
 
2,700h 2,100 0.01% 
9 Croatia 5 4,587,800 371 1,329 1,700b   
 
12,000i 6,900 0.15% 
10 El Salvador 13 4,920,590   55,000 55,000b 50,000 23,000 73,000d 89,000 1.81% 
11 Eritrea 4 3,354,103   98,192 98,192b   100,000 100,000d 99,100 2.95% 
12 Ethiopia 4 65,615,948   98,192 98,192b   100,000 100,000d 99,100 0.15% 
13 Georgia 4 4,870,525 178 2,586 2,764b   2,500 2,500d 2,700 0.06% 
14 Guatemala 31 7,671,920 2,325 46,300 48,625b 210,000 17,500 227,500d 138,100 1.80% 
15 Guinea-Bissau 2 1,210,355   2,000 2,000c   
 
1,000j 1,500 0.12% 
16 Indonesia 17 205,702,159 3,288 3,338 6,626b 5,000 
 
5,000d 7,500 0.00% 
17 Kosovo 2 1,864,000   2,639 2,639b 10,000 
 
10,000d 12,600 0.68% 
18 Lebanon 16 2,499,944   144,000 144,000b   
 
131,000d 137,500 5.50% 
19 Liberia 12 2,499,944 14,752 3,051 17,803b 100,000 
 
100,000d 60,400 2.42% 
20 Mozambique 17 12,487,512 1,638 4,361 5,999b   
 
900,000dl 453,000 3.63% 
21 Namibia 17 1,060,309 388 25,000 25,388b   
 
13,000d 19,200 1.81% 
22 Nepal 11 24,069,590 3,301 9,916 13,217b   
 
5,000d 9,100 0.04% 
23 Nicaragua 13 3,611,923   30,000 30,000b 25,000 10,000 35,000d 45,000 1.25% 
24 Papua New Guinea 8 4,601,966 59 2,000 2,059b   
 
15,000k 8,500 0.18% 
25 Rwanda 4 7,752,040 817,448 4,246 821,694b   
 
1,000,000d 910,800 11.75% 
26 Sierra Leone 11 4,383,364 20,049 11,473 31,522b 50,000 
 
50,000d 46,500 1.06% 
27 Sri Lanka 27 18,055,000 4,650 60,640 65,290b   
 
65,000d 65,100 0.36% 
28 Tajikistan 6 5,720,909 96 8,372 8,468b   
 
100,000d 54,200 0.95% 
29 Timor-Leste 25 723,566   18,000 18,000b 120,000 11,000 131,000d 134,500 18.59% 







a  Population statistics are from the World Development Indicators at databank.worldbank.org.  
In-Conflict population is derived as the mean population of all years in which the country was 
in the observed conflict 
b Gleditsch and Lacina (2005) Uppsala / PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP) 
c  Lacina, Bethany (2009) explains in her coding interpretation that due to lack of best 
estimates, the range of BDs is between 1,000 - 2,000 
d Leitenberg, Milton (2006) 
e Marie-Janine Calic (2013) 
f Vicenç Fisas (2009) 
g UNHCR (2002) Death estimates were derived from a country wide questionnaire with a 
specific scope to estimate refugees and IDPs and the numbers are likely to be civilian deaths 
h Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (2018) determines both civilian 
and military casualties from an event tracker and the estimate provided is derived from 
multiple reporting sources 
i Research and Documentation Center (2006) “Transitional Justice in Post-Yugoslav 
Countries,” Sarajevo 
j Nielsen, Jensen, Kragh, Andersen and Aaby (2006)  
k Braithwaite, John (2010) 
l Human Rights Watch (1992) cited a 600,000 total deaths estimate 
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Quantifying conflict intensity is challenging for analysts as innumerable factors drive 
actors to war, and their complexity becomes difficult to express in equations.  These 
driving factors are tangent upon human rationale, emotion, and willpower and often 
cannot be quantified.  Additionally, scale of conflict holds a relative value to each 
community with distinct parameters for what is considered a minor or major conflict in 
their country.   
Curiously, when intensity is attempted to be measured, as it must be and cannot be 
ignored, any assigned value will naturally take on a comparative role among other 
conflicts whether or not comparison was the original intention.  Assigning a “major” or 
“minor” in terms of severity of destruction (Gleditsch et al, 2002) implicitly links to a 
preconceived notion of what is more or less standard from historical conflict numbers, 
which is to offer an implied comparison among other conflicts.  A “minor” conflict, 
defined by less than 1,000 battle deaths, may be, relative to a smaller country, far more 
damaging to the respective economy than a conflict over 1,000 battle deaths in a larger 
country.   
Foreign assistance, measured by net ODA received per capita, follows a similar pattern 
of relative valuation as well.  When donor countries are impacted by the perceived 
intensity of conflict A, emergency funding is funneled to it, which implies that conflict 
B is, by de facto terms of aid, less severe.44 Therefore, a conflict intensity estimate, 
although a theoretical comparison of disaggregated samples of apples and oranges, is 
still a necessary academic endeavor due to the international community’s overreliance 
on analytic tools and indexes to simplify extremely complex problem sets.    
Another approach in intensity estimation is to analyze major institutional changes as a 
direct result of a conflict’s termination and then estimate its impact in real terms.  
Mozambique, Nepal, and Nicaragua reshaped the political landscape through their civil 
wars by either establishing multi-party politics, ending a long-tenured monarchy, or 
overthrowing a dictator, respectively.  However, the outcomes of other conflicts may 
see little transition at all.  Sri Lanka achieved a decisive victory against the Tamil Tigers 
in 2009, ending its 27-year long civil war45 with an estimated conflict death toll of 
44 This remains true throughout the sample for total net ODA variable with the exception of 
humanitarian assistance flow, as discussed extensively in Section III.  In the sample, humanitarian 
assistance surprisingly had a higher allocation in reconstructions with less human suffering, and was 
not significantly related to poverty or developmental levels.  This discrepancy derives from inefficient 
programming of aid by donor countries and countries that may exhibit tendencies to have developed 
aid dependence as explained later. 
45 See Table 1.1 for conflict dates. 
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65,10046 that resulted in few transitional changes to the central government except for 
new national security policies.47  Transformational transitions may imply a greater need 
for of extensive reconstruction efforts than by simply measuring battle destruction. 
Conflict intensity can also be characterized by a variety of metrics: as increases in battle 
deaths, flow and stock of migrants and displaced persons, extent of infrastructure 
damage, political or security transitions in the government, and the extent of 
dysfunctional rule of law / breaking of the social contract.  While physical infrastructure 
can be restored or replaced, human capital however, from a population standpoint, 
requires much greater investment and can take a generation’s time to restore in the 
aftermath of a violent conflict.   
Due to the lack of a standardized indicator, this study has developed the Human Capital 
Loss Index, which is a harmonized index across all 30 country observations.  A 
significant interpretation of both the panel data in Section II and reconstruction 
stimulants in Section III is dependent on explaining the degree of intensity of a 
particular conflict.  Human Capital Loss, or HCL, is compiled from a range of migration 
and death estimates from each conflict, then weighted by each observation’s population 
statistics, and finally harmonized through a relative group value.  It is understood that 
both war deaths and migration statistics are estimates only and vary amongst all 
sources; however, when combined together, even as an estimate, they can provide a 
better understanding of perceived conflict intensity and its impact on the domestic 
economy.      
Human capital loss during a conflict must be reflected both as total volume and 
proportionally as a percentage of population.  Volume as a variable, Tot_Adj_Con_Dth, 
represents the intensity or depth of the conflict-originating grievance among dyads.48  
This assessment is derived from the psychological nature of killing as studied by 
Grossman (1995)49 who identifies that the innate nature of mankind is to initially resist 
the act of killing as a species survival mechanism.  Grossman analyzes instances of 
killing conditioning whereby soldiers, placed on firing lines in order to increase 
response efficiency, still experienced resistances to killing, despite being ordered to 
fire.   
46 See Table 1.2 
47 Öglund, Kristine H and Orjuela, Camilla, (2011), “Winning the Peace: conflict and prevention after a 
victor’s peace in Sri Lanka” Contemporary Social Science, 6:1, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group 
48 Doyle and Sambanis (2006) refer to grievances while Gleditsch et al (2002) refer to 
incompatibilities.  Both are used synonymously in this paper. 
49 Grossman, Dave. (1995). On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. 
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With this psychological principle in mind, cases of one-sided state violence against a 
semi-armed or unarmed people group such as the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi 
in 1994 would require a deep grievance that pushes soldiers and militiamen beyond 
basic killing conditioning.  In this case, the grievance derived from centuries of tribal 
fighting, power shifts, and deeply-implanted ethnic hatred that resulted in more than 
800,000 men, women, and children slaughtered viciously in in a matter of months.50   
While conflict death total, both military and civilian, provides insight into conflict 
intensity from both a grievance standpoint and a loss of human life standpoint, it is 
limited in one particular role.  That is, it does not measure the relative effect to the 
population as a whole.  A ratio of conflict-related deaths to total population, 
Con_Dth_%_Pop, when compared to total output and other variables, better explains 
the macroeconomic impact as a labor force supply shock. 
 In many cases, harmonized labor statistics are not 
capable of accounting for the ebb and flow of forced 
migration, and can often lead econometric studies 
astray, offering higher confidence intervals derived 
from more stable theoretical variables than the volatile 
ones actually found during and after a conflict.  There 
is a notable disparity between migration statistics and 
labor and unemployment data in current online 
databases.  As an example, the maximum amount of 
internally displaced persons (IDP) in the borders of 
Ethiopia during the war with Eritrea between 1998 
and 2001 is estimated to be 143,000, but only 
represents 0.22% of the large Ethiopian population of 
65.6 million.51  Meanwhile, similar numbers of IDPs 
in Eritrea, 207,000 represented 6.17% of the 
population as a much smaller country.  All other 
variables being equal, this signifies that the less than 
a quarter percent added temporarily to the 
unemployment rate in Ethiopia is of minimal 
consequence compared to the massive unemployment 
shock produced in Eritrea, despite both countries having similar total IDPs.   
50 Eck and Hultman (2007) 
51 Table 1.3 
Economic Effects of 
Forced Migration 
Forced migration in any form 
can produce lasting damage to 
economies in conflict, even in 
the case of IDPs. 
Distortions to productivity can 
be both temporary and long-
term with many never returning 
home at all.   
For IDPs that resettle, entire 
households become uprooted 
and are forced to implant 
themselves in unfamiliar 
settings, increasing inefficiency 
in social services and 
employment. 
Intra-regional imbalances are 
produced as the conflict-
affected region experiences a 
demand shock as migrants flee 
and a new region’s supply 
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However, unemployment rises during these conflicts are not accurately recorded in 
many cases due to lack of national reporting and the temporary inaccessibility of 
surveys – both of which exacerbate the acknowledged limitations of international 
modeled labor estimates.  According to the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 
modeled estimates during the same period, Eritrea’s unemployment rate improved from 
6.8% to 6.6%52 from 1998-2001 despite an additional 6.17% of the population 
becoming dislodged and a large portion being temporarily unemployed.  If not 
accounted for in unemployment rates, then a massive shift in the labor supply curve 
should be apparent in the data as it can be argued that IDPs are temporarily removed 
from the total workforce.  ILOSTAT, however, record an average annual increase in 
labor force total of 3.6% (1998-2001), higher than the 2.2% growth in the same period 
pre-conflict (1994-1997)53.  Therefore, the human capital inefficiency derived from 
forced migration in temporary conflict situations isoften not recorded.      
The same can be seen throughout other conflicts in this study.  Côte d'Ivoire endured 
an increase (flow) of 671,100 IDPs (3.7% of population) from 2005 to 2006 during the 
First Ivorian War (2002–2007),54 yet ILO modeled estimates see improvements in total 
unemployment rate from 3.50% to 3.41% during the same period and continually 
improves every year following.55  In 2011, an estimated 602,000 finally returned, which 
yields a five-year average length of displacement, and likely five-year unemployment, 
for more than 3% of the affected population.   
This disparity of IDPs missing in labor data is not explained through population 
statistics either.  The increase of total population during the six-year war from 17.36 
million to 19.09 million had only a slight 0.8% reduction of average population growth 
between pre-conflict rates and intra-conflict rates, which may account for refugee flow 
and conflict-related direct and indirect deaths, but not IDPs as they still categorically 
remain part of the national population.  Due to this, nominal labor statistics may mislead 
econometric models attempting to evaluate conflict or crisis studies, whereas HCL is 
more apt at measuring human capital inefficiency in economies after conflict, as seen 
in Table 1.3 below.   
 
 
52 Worldbank, ILO labor force estimates. 
53 ILOSTAT, International Labor Organization Database. 
54 Table 1.3. 








                                                     
   




























As % of 
Population 
    
      
 
    
1 Angola 6 16,256,651 188,800b 1.16% 257,500b 1.58% 68,400 0.42% 1.61 
2 Azerbaijan 4 7,436,250 127,500b 1.71% 778,000b 10.46% 8,200 0.11% 1.80 
3 Bosnia 4 4,029,920 993,900b 24.66% 1,290,000b 32.01% 64,200 1.59% 3.15 
4 Burundi 15 6,312,247 679,800b 10.77% 882,900b 13.99% 119,100 1.89% 2.62 
5 Cambodia 14 7,710,586 116,000b 1.50% 124,100b 1.61% 1,895,500 24.58% 3.13 
6 Chad 6 10,964,694 19,400b 0.18% 170,500b 1.55% 18,300 0.17% 1.48 
7 Republic of Congo 7 2,885,250 21,100b 0.73% 89,700b 3.11% 18,800 0.65% 1.53 
8 Côte d'Ivoire 6 18,194,215 32,900b 0.18% 709,200b 3.90% 2,100 0.01% 1.64 
9 Croatia 5 4,587,800 245,600b 5.35% 344,000bc 7.50% 6,900 0.15% 1.78 
10 El Salvador 13 4,920,590 213,200c 4.33% 600,000c 12.19% 89,000 1.81% 2.16 
11 Eritrea 4 3,354,103 57,800d 1.72% 207,000d 6.17% 99,100 2.95% 1.68 
12 Ethiopia 4 65,615,948 20,000d 0.03% 143,000d 0.22% 99,100 0.15% 1.43 
13 Georgia 4 4,870,525 47,800b 0.98% 260,000b 5.34% 2,700 0.06% 1.54 
14 Guatemala 31 7,671,920 100,000e 1.30% 1,000,000e 13.03% 138,100 1.80% 2.60 
15 Guinea-Bissau 2 1,210,355 8,100b 0.67% 195,600b 16.16% 1,500 0.12% 1.65 
16 Indonesia 17 205,702,159 26,600f 0.01% 120,000 f 0.06% 7,500 0.00% 1.68 
17 Kosovo 2 1,864,000 40,100g 2.15% 209,000g 11.21% 12,600 0.68% 1.63 
18 Lebanon 16 2,499,944 33,100g 1.32% 1,000,000g 40.00% 137,500 5.50% 2.82 
19 Liberia 12 2,499,944 110,600b 4.42% 531,616b 21.27% 60,400 2.42% 2.25 
20 Mozambique 17 12,487,512 1,410,700b 11.30% 3,000,000b 24.02% 453,000 3.63% 3.80 
21 Namibia 17 1,060,309 75,600b 7.13% --- ---  19,200 1.81% 1.87 
22 Nepal 11 24,069,590 --- --- 200,000g 0.83% 9,100 0.04% 1.57 
23 Nicaragua 13 3,611,923 81,100h 2.25% 600,000h 16.61% 45,000 1.25% 2.11 
24 Papua New Guinea 8 4,601,966 20,000i 0.43% 60,000i 1.30% 8,500 0.18% 1.49 
25 Rwanda 4 7,752,040 1,938,100bc 25.00% 625,000bc 8.06% 910,800 11.75% 3.53 
26 Sierra Leone 11 4,383,364 179,100b 4.09% 782,000b 17.84% 46,500 1.06% 2.20 
27 Sri Lanka 27 18,055,000 145,400b 0.81% 731,800b 4.05% 65,100 0.36% 2.22 
28 Tajikistan 6 5,720,909 107,500b 1.88% 520,000b 9.09% 54,200 0.95% 1.80 
29 Timor-Leste 25 723,566 260,000cj 35.93% --- ---  134,500 18.59% 3.22 





a  Population statistics are from the World Development Indicators at databank.worldbank.org.  In-Conflict population is derived as the mean population of all years in which the country 
was in the observed conflict b United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Population Statistics Database (2015)   
c  Doyle and Sambanis (2006) d Dessalegn, Bezaiet (2004)  FMO Country Guides. Statistics from ForcedMigration.org and UNECA e Costello, Patrick (1995) 
f Howard, Caroline (2014)  Indonesia: Durable solutions needed for protracted IDPs as new displacement occurs in Papua, IDMC g IDMC (2013) h Tucker, Spencer (2016) 
i Braithwaite, John (2010) j UNHCR (2005) UNHCR Country Operations Plan 2006 - Timor-Leste 
--- Distinction between refugees and IDPs was not clear in any source, rather, the term displacement was frequently used  
 
HCL IDP_Stk_%_Pop Ref_Flw_%_Pop Max_Ref_Flw Max_IDP_Stk Tot_Adj_Con_Dth Con_Dth_%_Pop 
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HCL is calculated utilizing a harmonized index of all 30 observations in each variable 
seen in Table 1.3.  The standard indexing format utilized by the United Nations 
Populations Division is: 
 
  
Then the aggregate index is adjusted to a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is the low amount of 
human capital loss and 4 is the possible high in the given sample.  The maximum score 
mathematically is -6.5, but the sample maximum is effectively -3.80 with Mozambique.   
Where t is the time period for each conflict, HCL (Human Capital Loss) is measured as 
the adjusted mean of seven variables: B (Tot_Adj_Con_Dth), BP (Con_Dth_%_Pop),  
D (Conflict Duration),  R (Max_Ref_Flw),  RP (Ref_Flw_%_Pop),  I (Max_IDP_Stk),  
and IP (IDP_Stk_%_Pop).   
 
With the inclusion of the HCL in the economic reconstruction model, correlations can 
be estimated with HCL as an explanatory variable that harmonizes the sample and 
demonstrates, in effect, one interpretation of conflict intensity.  This does not mean that 
other variables such as capital flight or infrastructure damage are excluded.  Rather, 
they are analyzed separately in the model explained in Section II since harmonization 












𝐼𝐼𝑥𝑥 = 100 ×
(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)
(𝑥𝑥max  − 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)
  















Despite the contextual uniqueness of each conflict and its outcome, certain macroeconomic tendencies, 
and more specifically, market orientations, can be measured, and through the panel data and estimates 
conducted in this section, it is proven that conflict-recovering economies are progressively 
liberalizing, generating inequality, and growing at a faster rate than their respective income group 
averages.  The methodology utilized in this section employs both correlation coefficients through fixed 
effects estimates to evaluate the relationship among selected variables and economic growth and 
inequality as well as comparative cross-sectional analysis among all 30 country (i) observations to 
highlight tendencies.  The indicators seen in Table 2.1 conform to basic economic theory and avoid the 
pitfalls discussed in Verbeek and Nijman (1996)56 regarding selection bias in panel data as the stringent 
coding rules were outlined in Figure 1.3.   This section centralizes the focus of efforts in stimulating 
economic growth, following the Section I explanation of its role in preventing conflict recurrence 
during a reconstruction period.  The group will be measured in their responses to absorbing and utilizing 
“post-conflict stimulants” and will be evaluated according to paces of recovery or stagnation. 
 
For all panel data, the time series (t) is standardized among observations and configured 
as the conflict end date as calculated in Table 1.1.  As an example, for coding El 
Salvador’s GDP growth rate in 1992 during its second year of reconstruction, (𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) 
represents the GDP annual growth rate of country (i) during reconstruction year (t) with 
a corresponding value of (𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) = 7.54%.  Coding time series according to conflict end 
dates rather than by years allows the synchronization of reconstruction activities in 
collective groupings.  This time synchronization was also utilized by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) in the 2008 Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction 
Report57 and allowed comparative analysis within their sample.   
Seeing countries’ responses in terms of post-conflict years, in lieu of actual years, 
permits quantitative comparison.  As Timor-Leste emerged from civil war in 1997, its 
reconstruction process in terms of economic growth, capital flow, foreign investment, 
and development assistance etc., is truly not directly comparable with that of El 
Salvador in 1997, as El Salvador’s reconstruction was already well in-stride and in its 
sixth year.  A more apt comparison is Timor-Leste E through E+1 (1997-1998) with El 
Salvador E through E+1 (1991-1992) as both economies initiated recovery after a major 
conflict.  While distinct differences exist across the sample of 30 post-conflict countries, 
all pass through quantitatively similar episodes of reconstruction together.  This serves 
56 Verbeek M.; Nijman, T. (1996). “Incomplete Panels and Selection Bias.” The Econometrics of Panel 
Data. Advanced Studies in Theoretical and Applied Econometrics, vol 33. 
57 Ohiorhenuan and Stewart (2008). 
Methodology and selected indicators 
SECTION II: Post-Conflict Macroeconomic Responses  
Inequality, Growth, and Trade Liberalization 
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as a quasi-common denominator among all the countries in the sample, and from here, 
individual (unique) responses can be measured.   
Utilizing time offset carries the inherent risk of creating distortions across the sample, 
especially during periods of global crises where financial sector and commodity price 
shocks can greatly alter interpretation as exogenous variables; however, result-altering 
distortions were not noted in the sample.  In the selected period of 1989 – 2014, the 
majority of post-conflict countries were relatively unaffected by several global crises 
mainly due to having initially closed economies.  The early 90s recession for several 
OECD countries appears to have little to no impact on the 5 countries ending their 
conflicts during that timeframe; the dot-com bubble (1995-2000) had almost no impact 
on the sample; and the oil price bubble (2003-2009) only affected a handful of 
petroleum exporting countries, to include Azerbaijan, but the sample as a whole did not 
see major shocks. 
The global financial crisis (2007-2009) had marginal impacts on the more developed 
countries in the sample, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia; however, the 
majority of post-conflict countries maintained or even improved annual GDP growth 
rate during the period.  It appears that post-conflict countries operate on a trajectory 
separate from regional and global averages, as they move from the undefined window 
of reconstruction into longer-term sustainable development.   
Regarding the dataset created for this study, a combination of sources has been utilized; 
however sources are not mixed within a given variable in order to avoid skewing data.  
Currency denominators are maintained or converted (constant US$ 2010, current 
international $, local currency unit 2010) within each set of variables.  A list of raw data 
sources can be found in the bibliography under datasets.   
Given the scope of the data used (more than 7,600 observations), it can be correctly 
assumed that a panel study specifically targeting the short-term rebound and long-term 
development transition will note large standard errors due to inherent heteroscedasticity 
of each country.  In these cases, robust standard error (RSE) is utilized in fixed estimates 
that showed high heteroscedasticity following a White test.  Standardized regression 
coefficients (betas) have not been utilized as each variable across time and each country 
has already been standardized either in terms of % of GDP, per capita natural logarithm, 
or as percentage of population total.  Statistically significant t-distribution levels are 
indicated in each panel by an (*) next to a coefficient to indicate percentage level where 
(*) is at the 10% level (90% confidence level), (**) is at 5% (95% confidence level) 
and (***) is at the 1% (99% confidence level).  For both Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, the 
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an auxiliary regression of time-varying independent variables.  Consequently, fixed 
effects have been chosen over random effects estimation in each case.    
This study does not build a generalized model for economies in reconstruction, given 
that the time variance among each observed conflict would create systemic distortions.  
The study does, however, focus on the use of fixed effects estimation, incorporating 
both within and between values to comparatively view how each economy responded 
differently during episodes of reconstruction.  Specifically, the relative values 
extrapolated from particular indicators related to aid per capita (Ifap), trade openness 
(To), financial openness (Fo), and the Gini coefficient of income inequality demonstrate 
statistically significant correlations during economic reconstruction periods and have 
been selected for display.   
 
Aggregate supply and demand functions of each economy are not selected, rather, the 
selected indicators listed in Table 2.1 are designed to identify positive / negative 
correlations through a series of multiple linear regressions.  As an example, gross fixed 
Variable Short Title Long Title Data Source 
Aep AccessElectricPop Access to electricity (% pop) World Bank 
Awp AccessWaterPop Access to water source (% pop) World Bank 
Id CapFormationFixed Gross fixed capital formation (% GDP) WB / OECD 
Ck ConFixedCap Consumption of fixed capital (% GNI) WB / UNSDNAS 
Cg ConGovExpen Government consumption expenditure (% GDP) WB / UNSDNAS 
Chg ConHousegrth Household final consumption (annual % growth) WB / OECD 
Cn ConNatRes Natural resources depletion (% GNI) World Bank 
If FDInetflow Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% GDP) IMF 
Fo FinOpen Net financial assets and liabilities (% GDP) Lane, Milesi IMF 
Yg GDPgrowth GDP growth (annual %) World Bank 
Ypl GDPPCPPP_LN Natural log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011) World Bank 
Gini GINIindex GINI index  World Bank 
Sd GrsSavgs Gross savings (% GNI) World Bank 
HCL HumCapLoss Human Capital Loss Index Author’s Calculations / Multiple Sources 
Rpi InflationPr Inflation, consumer prices annual (%) IMF 
Ifa NetODA Net ODA received (% GNI) DAC OECD 
Ifap NetODA_PC Net ODA received per capita (Current US$) DAC OECD 
Prp PopPoverty National poverty headcount ratio (% population) WB / GPWG 
Pru PopUrban Urban Population (% Total) UNPD 
Re REER Real effective exchange rate index (2010 = 100) IMF 
M Trd_MportOp Imports of goods and services (% GDP) WB / OECD 
Rxm Trd_ToT Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100) UNCTAD 
Sxm Trd_XMServ  Services value added (% GDP) WB / OECD 
X Trd_XportOp Exports of goods and services (% GDP) WB / OECD 
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capital formation Kd is utilized in lieu of total capital formation, also referred to as total 
domestic investment, in order to measure its correlation with official developmental aid 
Ifa and foreign direct investment flow If, which likely hold strong relationships in 
creating domestic physical productive capacities.  In Section III a more detailed 
relationship of type and volume of foreign aid among post-conflict recipients is 
discussed further.   
Summarized statistics of each variable across observations are listed below for 



















Much literature focuses on the dynamic relationship between economic growth and 
rising inequality primarily due to the controversial merits of globalization.  Both 
58 Re is utilized in place of the traditional symbol ε, which is utilized in this paper to represent the error 
term in regressions 
59 Trade Openness (To) = Total Imports (M) + Total Exports (X) / GDP.  (To) is substituted for the sum 
of (M) and (X) in some panel estimates. 
60 Fo is derived from the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) dataset, calculated as Total Assets + Total 
Liabilities / GDP  
Variable Access_Electric Access_Water CapForm ConFixCap ConGovExpen ConHousegrth ConNatRes FDInet 
 Aep Awp Id Ck Cg Chg Cn If 
Observations 404 389 368 394 373 317 347 380 
Mean 52.29 69.27 20.74 10.79 18.05 4.98 9.18 5.31 
Standard Dev. 37.54 18.61 8.60 6.84 19.07 10.47 13.28 9.55 
Minimum 0.02 23.50 4.01 0.88 3.46 -34.14 0.00 -5.98 
Maximum 100 99.20 69.36 46.25 163.58 92.51 64.54 89.48 
 
         
Variable Fin_Open GDP_growth GDPPCPPP_LN GINI_index GrsSavgs HumCapLoss InflationPr ODAnet 
 Fo60 Yg Ypl Gini Sd HCL Rpi Ifa 
Observations 390 399 402 90 304 30 334 391 
Mean -0.81 6.03 7.97 40.08 17.31 2.15 8.90 12.42 
Standard Dev. 1.57 7.85 0.94 9.68 16.11 0.680 14.28 18.64 
Minimum -12.84 -30.15 5.87 16.20 -40.68 1.43 -35.84 -0.04 
Maximum 2.83 88.96 10.00 63.30 107.87 3.80 162.72 192.03 
 
         
Variable NetODA_PC PopPoverty PopUrban REER Trd_Imports Trd_Terms Trd_XMServ Trd_Exports 
 Ifap Prp Pru Re58 M 59 ToT Sxm X 59 
Observations 397 65 375 103 379 331 327 379 
Mean 73.94 35.67 37.95 98.82 50.57 116.26 24.34 30.11 
Standard Dev. 71.78 17.96 18.68 12.67 29.94 43.17 31.00 20.39 
Minimum -1.50 6.70 9.38 59.60 20.05 49.02 5.71 4.43 
Maximum 444.02 69.40 86.58 142.24 236.39 432.93 266.73 98.76 
 
Table 2.2 – Summary Statistics (24 Variables) (30 Countries 1989 – 2014)  
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directions - inequality to growth and growth to inequality - have been thoroughly 
analyzed in post-conflict literature, with statistical results highly dependent on selection 
criteria of countries, years, and explanatory variables.  The range is immense, from 
studies centered on “gotcha” / one-off examples to more robust aggregate studies over 
thousands of observations measuring the slightest change in coefficients to claim 
victory as king of theory hill.  The traditional arguments have repeated themselves ever 
since the bombshell publication of the Kuznetz (1955)61 inverse-U curve where 
inequality sharply rises as economic growth increases, and then inequality slowly 
decreases over time.  Kaldor (1957)62 explained this phenomenon in terms of savings 
and investment and that the wealthy are more Pareto-efficient while mounds of recent 
evidence suggest that wealth accumulation is incentive-based and that the lack of 
investment in poorer countries can be explained better by aggressive rent-seeking 
(Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996).63 
For the Gini-Growth direction, Cingano (2014) explains that income inequality is on 
the rise within advanced economies as well as globally and that it negatively affects 
economic growth in the mid to long term.64  Alesina and Rodrik (1994)65 demonstrate 
how inequality directly decreases economic growth principally through policies and 
taxation, stifling demand.  For the Growth-Gini direction, Benabou (1996) 66 and Barro 
(2000) 67 echo similar findings that inequality is on the rise partly due to economic 
growth.  Forbes (2000)68 argues that this correlation is rendered insignificant when 
constructed holistically with human capital factors, and Lim (2014)69 finds economic 
growth significantly decreases income inequality while other factors, to include 
government spending, are more to blame for rising inequality.  Other interpretations, 
Milanovic (2005), 70 categorize the rise of global inequality and its disparate effects on 
poorer countries, namely that inequality is exacerbated by growth.  Ironically, the 
effects of inequality are also unequal themselves.  
With the current and everlasting debate mentioned, this section focuses not on the 
general relationship between growth and income inequality, but instead identifies how 
61 Kuznets, Simon. (1955). “Economic growth and income inequality.” American Economic Review 45. 
62 Kaldor, Nicholas. (1957). “A model of economic growth.” Economic Journal 57. 
63 Benhabib, Jess; Rustichini, Aldo. (1996). “Social Conflict Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth vol. 1, issue 1. 
64 Cingano, F. (2014). “Trends in Income Inequality and Its Impact on Economic Growth", OECD SEM Working 
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income inequality moves during an economic reconstruction period and the conflict-
specific inputs that affect it.  As poverty reduction is a primary sustainable development 
goal of the international community, for economic reconstruction to be successful, 
drastic inequalities that last long periods of time must be avoided to promote inclusive 
growth, but also, pragmatically speaking, to prevent conflict recurrence.  
Lim (2014) uses a robust panel study centered on income inequality and defines its 
relationship with trade and financial openness.  He argues that trade and financial 
openness are viable means both to increase economic growth and to reduce income 
inequality according to his panel estimates of 42 countries with varying levels of 
income as GDP per capita in a fifteen year period 1992 – 2007.71  He concludes that 
the differences among income groupings are varied, showing one positive relationship 
for one, a negative for the other.  In his results, relative income growth (by world GDP 
per capita) had a positive correlation to inequality in LICs whereas income growth 
through overall GDP growth (Yg) strongly reduced income inequality (negative 
relationship).   Additionally, his results show government expenditure as increasing 
inequality, particularly in the LMICs, but not in the LICs or UMICs.   
How do conflict-recovering economies differ regarding inequality?  Simply stated, the 
macroeconomic effects on income distribution are much more dynamic immediately 
post-conflict than they are within the non-conflict income peer groups. Section III 
explains how economic reconstruction is not “development as usual” (Del Castillo, 
2008), especially in countries that experienced high degrees of human capital loss 
(HCL).   
On average, conflict-recovering economies tend to see spikes in 
humanitarian and developmental assistance, FDI, and external financing 
within the first five years of reconstruction.  These large inward flows are 
paramount to restoring basic services, and stimulating economic activity, 
but they can, and do, spur distortions in income inequality.  This flood of 
wealth is also disproportional across income groupings.    First, the 
distribution of net ODA (Ifa) as a percentage of GNI is inversely 
proportional to the level of development, especially in low income 
countries. Second, the mean volume of annual ODA received as 
percentage of GNI from end (E) of conflict to E+15 for the full sample 
(30 countries, 410 observations) is immense and represents 12.4% of 
average national income.  
71 Only 7 countries from Lim’s study coincide with the 30 conflict countries presented in this study.  
Post-Conflict 
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As a broader measure, overall GDP growth (Yg) and GDP per capita (Ypl) income 
relative to the world average also see substantial shifts immediately post-conflict as 
economic activity fully resumes, although figures may be deceiving as nominal 
increases often represent a restoration of previous activity and not necessarily a creation 
of new.  In total, this influx creates challenges for weak central government institutions 
that initially lack regulatory capacities to effect taxation or emplace labor policies, and 
as a result, such surges in economic growth are unable to be harnessed.  This is readily 
seen through the coefficients in Table 2.3.  
Utilizing the same methodology as Lim (2014), but within the post-conflict sample, 
Table 2.3 compares how independent variables GDPgrowth (Yg), GDP(rel) (Ypl)72, 
ConGovExpen (Cg), TrdOp (To), FDInetflow (If), NetODA (Ifa) affect dependent variable 
Gini, which is a measure of income distribution utilizing the Lorenz curve (0 being 
perfect equality and 100 perfect inequality).  The following equation is applied for 
Table 2.3:  
 
 
Where ͠   indicates that each variable has been transformed to their time-demeaned 
versions in order to standardize for the fixed effects model and observe each individual 
country’s “within” values.  Unobservable variable 𝜔𝜔� remains and is not assumed to be 
constant over time, and 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the error term.  
While the results of the full sample are not substantial, the regressions yield statistically 
significant results when separating samples by income groups.  The results indicate that 
for low income conflict-recovering economies, all four independent variables: 
economic growth, relative GDP per capita, government expenditure, and trade 
72 Not outlined in Table 2.3, GDP per capita relative value is the annual value of country and time GDP 
per capita divided by the world average from databank.worldbank.org, methodology from Lim, 2014. 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  = 𝛽𝛽1𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌� 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝑌𝑌�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼� 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽7𝜔𝜔�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑚𝑖𝑖 
 R2 GDP_growth GDPPC(rel) ConGov Trd_Open FDInet ODAnet 
Y = GINI (Within) Yg Ypl Cg To If Ifa 
Full Conflict Sample (30) 0.378 -0.077 -0.334    0.188*  -0.032 -0.248*** 0.036 
Low Income (11) 0.743     1.217***     4.524***   3.984***   0.564***  -0.679* -0.683* 
Lower Middle Income (14) 0.093 -0.013 -0.032    0.110  -0.033   0.105 0.022 
Upper Middle Income (5) 0.840    -0.423***     -0.123***  -2.342***   0.073  -0.381** -1.740* 
 
Table 2.3 – Fixed Effects Estimate: Income Inputs on Inequality (Lim, 2014 Methodology) 
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openness highly correlate to increases in income inequality (Gini).  This is not surprising 
as the international fight against inequality has centered on major discrepancies in low 
income countries due to rising inequality coupled with growth as many studies have 
proven.73,74,75  
Growth aside, government spending shows interesting results across groupings.  The 
empirical evidence indicates that if governments of LICs trend towards an expansionary 
fiscal policy during economic reconstruction, stimulating output 
through social spending (assuming taxation is relatively ineffective), the 
side effect is a sharp rise of 3.984% of income inequality; while on the 
contrary, UMICs that increase government spending see a corollary 
coefficient decrease of 2.342% of income inequality.  Institutional 
effectiveness plays a key role in the interpretation of these results.  LICs 
emerging from conflict likely have experienced shocks or sudden 
changes to already underdeveloped policy management capacities.  It 
follows then that increases of government spending when institutions 
are largely inefficient will lead to wasteful use of public funds.  UMICs 
tend to have more developed institutions that can legislate and enforce policies, 
meaning that more efficient government spending distributes wealth in the form of 
services to the poor.  For LMICs, the result is statistically insignificant.     
Trade openness (To), in terms of Gini, tends to produce higher inequality in low income 
countries.  To has marginal effects on inequality in other samples and overall was not 
statistically significant in the full sample.  Foreign direct investment (If) is seen as an 
inequality reducer in both LICs and UMICs within the context of post-conflict 
economic reconstruction.  Conflict-affected economies require large investment to spur 
growth, and when decoupled from mineral extraction industries, private sector 
investment can be an immediate job stimulant providing much needed income, which 
reduces short-term inequality and works hand-in-hand with peacekeeping operations to 
provide incentive for belligerents to continue disarmament.  For UMICs, demand for 
higher-skilled laborers may contribute to their investment’s inequality-reduction effect.  
Another explanation of Gini reduction attributed to FDI is the controversial presence of 
mineral extraction industries.  While economic effects of depleting natural resources in 
73 Cornia, Giovanni Andrea. (2017). “An econometric analysis of the bifurcation of within-country 
inequality trends in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2011” UNDP, Regional Bureau for Africa. UNDP-
RBA/WPS 4/2016. 
74 Mishra, Prachi and Montiel, Peter. (2014). “How Effective Is Monetary Transmission in Low-
Income Countries? A Survey of the Empirical Evidence.” IMF Working Paper/12/143. 
75 Ohiorhenuan and Stewart (2008). 
Low income countries 
are most susceptible to 
increases in income 
inequality immediately 
post-conflict due to 
positive correlations 
with increases in 
government 
expenditure and surges 
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a fragile country are substantially negative in the long-run, significant reduction in 
measured inequality in the short term has been noted in this particular sample.  Using a 
threshold of consumption of natural resources (Cn) of greater than 10% in terms of 
GDP to indicate those countries with mature extraction industries, the data shows a 
significant average reduction of the Gini coefficient by 2.67% during the reconstruction 
period.  These resource-rich post-conflict countries, however, have a greater tendency 
to see poor resource management and financial flow from weak institutions that lack 
social capital,76 placing them at risk for commodity price volatility, and eventually 
returning shocks back to the workers that initially profited from receiving a new job in 
the first place.  Table 2.4 demonstrates that Cn has a statistically significant positive 
relationship with Yg (GDP growth) through its correlation coefficient of (1.045***).  
Although a “gold-rush” operation temporarily generates largescale economic growth, 
the effects are not usually sustainable.     
In Azerbaijan’s post-conflict petroleum rush at the turn of the century, net FDI inflows 
of only 14.36% of GDP in 2001 (E+7) rose to 54.4% in 2004 (E+10).  This type of FDI 
also was oriented to extraction and refinement industries that flipped a national 
commercial deficit of -23.93% of GDP in 2004 to a positive trade balance of 27.75% 
of GDP within two years.  The short term labor demand increased wages and decreased 
income inequality from 36.50 in 2001 down to 16.50 in 2004.  Since the peak of 
Azerbaijan’s petroleum export quota of 86% in 2008, Gini has risen back to 31.80, 
confirming a U-shaped inequality curve primarily due to the temporal income surge of 
natural resource depletion.  Long-term financial gains are either dominated by rent-
seeking governments who nationalize extraction industries or by foreign firms through 
financial flows back to advanced economies.  
 
Market orientation, traditionally understood by varying degrees of trade openness and 
financial openness, has demonstrated unique effects in post-conflict countries.  The 
trade measure of aperture, To is influenced by the terms of trade ToT and conflict-
specific foreign inflows which are official development assistance Ifa received and 
foreign direct investment If growth.  Fo is included due to the continual increase of 
international financial integration, and capital flight is noted in all countries in the 
sample.  Additionally sub-categories of aggregate demand, consumption of natural 
resources Cn and consumption of fixed capital Ck, are national income-altering 
variables specifically seen in conflict-recovering economies as relevant to the sample.  
76 Ohiorhenuan and Stewart (2008) 
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This measure of orientation stabilizes often over-inflated trade and financial openness 
due to mineral export industries Cn or firm inefficiency Ck, giving in a sense, a real 
value of To and Fo.   
The following equation is applied for the fixed effects panel estimate:   
 
 
In order to balance real trade effects on the economy, terms of trade (ToT) has been 
included in the panel.  ToT is expressed as an index of 100 with a base year of 2000 in 
order to standardize all 30 groupings and accounts for a liberalization effect of 
international trade whereby the ratio rises when export prices increase relative to import 
prices.  In recovering economies, the sample shows that the majority of economies with 
more open market orientations experienced a loss of competitiveness due to increasing 
price ratio, beginning at conflict end on average at 109.0 and reaching 121.3 by E+15.  
This increase correlates with trade openness To in post-conflict countries during the 
same time period, where the group average moved from 76.92% of GDP to 83.42%.  
While the FE estimate confirms statistical significance of ToT, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are not significant in regards to overall GDP growth. 
Trade Openness. Both trade openness (To) and financial openness (Fo) are statistically 
significant in each income grouping but have contrasting effects on economic growth.  
To positively correlates with GDP growth at a significant magnitude in low income and 
upper middle income countries with a coefficient of .090 and .142, respectively.  All 
other variables remaining constant, during the E to E+15 reconstruction period an 11 
percentage point increase of trade openness in post-conflict LICs theoretically would 
increase total domestic output by 1%.  For post-conflict UMICs, only a 7 point increase 
is required to yield the same result.   
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  = 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇� 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼� 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽7𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽8𝜔𝜔�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑚𝑖𝑖 
Table 2.4 – Fixed Effects Estimate: Post-Conflict Stimulants to GDP Growth 
 R2 Trd_Open Trd_Terms Fin_Open FDInet ODAnet ConNatRes ConFixCap 
Y = GDP Growth (Yg) (Within) To ToT Fo If Ifa Cn Ck 
Full Conflict Sample (30) 0.279 0.087***  0.012** -0.015*** -0.043 -0.020 0.257** -0.220 
Low Income (11) 0.396 0.090*** -0.020 -0.028*** -0.089*** -0.034*** 0.089 -0.357** 
Lower Middle Income (14) 0.254 0.040*  0.017*** -0.011*** -0.006  0.038 0.194* -0.221 
Upper Middle Income (5) 0.443 0.142*  0.053* -0.005***  0.231***  0.234 1.045***  0.436* 
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Conflict-recovering economies tend to see a marginal increase in trade relations during 
reconstruction, mainly due to the flood of imports from international markets initially,77 
and as firms increase domestic investment and as workers return home from either 
being displaced or from fighting during the conflict, production gradually restores, 
eventually leading to increases in exports that offset the initially high trade imbalance.  
In general, a pooled cross-sectional regression78 of trade openness on trade balance 
reveals a negative correlation coefficient of (-0.803***) indicating that post-conflict 
countries that open trade aperture on average will tend to acquire proportionally more 
imports than they will export, all other variables excluded.   
In practice, however, this ratio highly depends on both the terms of trade (ToT) and real 
effective exchange rate (Re) that underwrite the implied trade value and 
competitiveness from which recovering economy can usually profit from.  As the linear 
graphic Figure 2.1 indicates, a flood of imports is experienced immediately post- 
conflict, followed by a period of domestic production increase and subsequent export, 
then a return to equilibrium as both total trade increases and trade remains balanced.  
At the period of E+8, E+9 and E+10, the sample shows high inflation rates (6.4%, 6.8%, 
and 7.5% respectively) from both rapid growth and increases in broad money supply 
due to seigniorage.  This money-printing overreliance in recovering economies stems 
from high external debt pressures and poor monetary discipline.   
77 From E+1 to E+2, Liberia experienced a wave of imported goods valued at 223% of annual GDP, 
where quantities of medium-technology machinery and machinery-related manufactures doubled and 
food products quadrupled within one year.  A large focus of imports by firms was rebuilding fisheries 
and related shipping vessels. 

























      (raw materials,    
            minerals,  
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Increased equilibrium 
 (REER increase / 
increased inflationary 
pressures) 
Figure 2.1: Trade Trends in Post-Conflict Countries (sample average) 
Trade Openness % Change (E = 100) 
Trade Balance % Change (E = 100) 
Data Source: REER data from Darvis, Zsolt (2012), trade data from UNCTAD  
Author’s calculations 
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Consequently, Re, which began at 
97.2, has jumped to 108.7 by the 
end of E+9, making 
competitiveness difficult for 
developing economies.  This is 
attributable to both monetary 
policy and large inflows of 
foreign aid Ifa, as Rajan and Subramanian (2009)79 identify in 
Figure 2.2.  The prices of non-tradeable goods increase as donors pump cash into the 
domestic financial system, which directly and indirectly damages export 
competitiveness, i.e. tradeable goods.  While To is opening domestic producers to 
external demand and growing domestic industries, Ifa is working in the opposite 
direction.  Although, not all post-conflict economies respond similarly in this manner; 
richer countries in the study, as seen in the UMICs, tend to escape this trap during 
reconstruction.  However, countries with smaller quantities of foreign reserves, 
typically LICs, have little flexibility to maintain low rates.  This corresponds with the 
statistically significant negative correlation of Ifa on GDP growth Yg at (-0.034***) for 
LICs from the regressions in Table 2.4, meaning aid is actually decreasing potential 
GDP growth.  This spiral in LICs, from having poor monetary policies to receiving 
large sums of aid, to failing to control Re, and to creating trade deficits as To is increased 
by international community pressure – is a complicated trap that many post-conflict 
LICs have yet to escape.    
Terms of trade ToT increase briefly during this period likely due to additional 
production costs endured by high inflation, but firms quickly adjust due to the erosion 
of real wages and increase export quantity by E +12.  Around half of the post-conflict 
countries in the sample are raw material exporters and experience commodity price 
shocks that largely affect trade balances in any given year.  This vulnerability can 
become especially pronounced after conflicts where balance of payments slide into 
deficits and foreign reserves are critically low and unable to absorb shocks.  
The scatterplot of Figure 2.3 places indexed values of trade openness against trade 
balance in conflict-recovering economies from E to E+12.  End of conflict is indexed 
at 100 for both values, and each subsequent year for each of the 30 countries record the 
value change from end of conflict.  The pooled averages indicate greater increases to 
79 Rajan and Subramanian (2009) “Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth” Journal of 
Development Economics 94 (2011) 106–118.  
 
Source: Rajan and Subramanian (2009) 
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trade openness at an average of 6.5% and trade balance improved by 1.47% despite the 
negative corollary relationship.  Liberia demonstrated a large facilitation of trade during 
the period; Lebanon, however, oriented more inwardly, met a large household demand 
which surged to 139.6% of GDP at the end of the civil war as families resumed their 
lives and household savings flowed back into domestic banks.    
From a demand-driven reconstruction perspective, Goovearts et al (2005)80 identifies 
the positive impact of connecting local economic activities and livelihoods within an 
economy through sustainable strategies and local resources.  While expansionary policy 
of increased domestic consumption seems logical to push a stalling economy, 
ultimately, the question remains regarding the types of imports and foreign investment 
that are attracted.  Imports which undercut nascent industries and startups that have yet 
to industrialize, can face challenging competition.   
Cheap food imports, vital immediately post-conflict in a humanitarian sense, can over 
prolonged periods threaten local agriculture production and call into question national 
food sovereignty.  On the other hand, influxes of imports that augment local productive 
capacity through technology, machinery or manufactures that could facilitate improved 
efficiency would in turn bolster the production economy.  However, in a free market 
orientation, the risk of certain industries collapsing will always be a potential threat.  
This places both the central government of a post-conflict country and the international 
community in a challenging position between balancing immediate economic growth 
by increasing trade openness and supporting measures aimed to immediately reduce 
80 Goovaerts P; Gasser M; Belman Inbal A. (2005). “Demand Driven Approaches to Livelihood 









Figure 2.3: Trade Openness vs Trade Balance E: E+12 
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poverty as Sustainable Development Goal 1 mandates.  Essentially, reconstruction 
today places Bhagwati (2005)81 against Stiglitz (2002)82 in the practical application of 
liberalizing post-conflict markets.   
 
Financial Openness.  In economic reconstruction the financial sector can be 
configured in a variety of ways – from closed sectors dominated by nationalized banks 
with heavy capital controls to free market orientations with relatively few restrictions.  
Despite this assortment, the equalizing factor for all is having to endure a major armed 
conflict, and with it, the proximate risk of capital flight and even a potential collapse of 
the banking system altogether.  Firms and households alike grow uneasy during the pre-
conflict period as tensions rise, and when hostilities are on the horizon, they look 
towards emergency investment in foreign currencies.  This financial run, whether due 
to mistrust of the central government, physical displacement, fears of depreciation due 
to inflation, or fears of inconvertibility, ultimately becomes a top priority for a central 
bank to prevent.  Doing so, i.e. imposing stringent capital controls on outflows, 
becomes increasingly more difficult with the advent of technology and with the 
increasingly liberalized global 
financial sector that connects 
domestic firms to foreign banks with 
ease. Corresponding banking 
relationships continue to grow, even 
in cases of crisis or conflict and can 
be circumvented when shut-down.   
Figure 2.4 reveals that for the sample 
of conflicts studied, a trend emerges 
whereby the starting financial 
openness position of economies by the end of conflict, in year groupings, is 
progressively liberal.  As a regional example, sub-Saharan countries, on average, each 
began their respective conflicts with a higher financial openness.  Uganda in the 70s 
had a 10-year average Fo of 11% of GDP before their conflicts resurged in the 80s, 
Sierra Leone in the 80s averaged a 69.5% Fo, Ethiopia in the 90s a 102.3% Fo, and 
recently, Chad from 1995-2005 before the Chadian Civil War averaged 115.5% Fo83.  
81 Bhagwati, Jagdish “In Defense of Globalization” Oxford University Press. 
82 Stiglitz, Joseph 2002 “Globalization and its Discontents” W. W. Norton & Company. 
83 Data source of author’s calculations is from Lane, Philip R. and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, (2007) 
(2014). "The External Wealth of Nations Mark II", Journal of International Economics, November 












Figure 2.4 Financial Openness Average by Conflict End Date 
Data Source: Lane, Milesi 2014 
Author’s Calculations 
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Some outliers like Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and the Republic of Congo inflate the 
grouping average due to having relatively smaller, open economies; however, 
proportionally for each country in the study, the trend of increasing Fo is valid across 
the sample.   
The fixed effects estimate in Table 2.4 shows that Fo has a negative correlation on GDP 
growth across each income grouping that is statistically significant, although the 
magnitude of each coefficient is minimal, at -0.015 for the full sample.  The likely-
associated capital flight appears to impact low income countries more strongly than the 
other groupings, which is logical given that least developed countries tend to begin their 
respective conflicts with already debilitated, immature financial institutions.  
Additionally, those governments with fixed exchange rates quickly encounter 
difficulties with the “trilemma,” where a fixed exchange rate cannot coexist with both 
freely moving capital and sovereign monetary policy.       
For countries in the process of economic reconstruction, easing capital controls has 
been encouraged, if not mandated, by international financial institutions (IFI) and 
donors alike.  While the majority of the sample were actively receiving poverty 
reduction funding in the reconstruction period, structural conditionality from various 
donors often promoted increased private sector efficiency along with financial sector 
efficiency as core conditions to maintain receipt of funds like the Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility (PRGF).84  This in turn has promoted increases in foreign 
investment and, working hand in hand with the restructuring of central government 
external debt, increased additional international dependency.  As figure 2.5 
demonstrates, the majority of post-conflict countries in the sample vastly relaxed capital 
 
84 Allen, Mark 2005 “Review of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines” IMF. 
Figure 2.5 Capital Account Openness: Change (1996 to 2013) 
(1=Fully Liberalized) Data Source: Wang, 2017 IMF 
Author’s Calculations 
Country 2013 Chg Country 2013 Chg 
Angola 0.09 +0.07 Indonesia 0.50 +0.02 
Azerbaijan 0.73 +0.23 Lebanon 0.25  -0.68 
Burundi 0.09 +0.09 Liberia 1.00   0.00 
Cambodia 0.86 +0.86 Mozambique 0.00   0.00 
Chad 0.05 +0.05 Namibia 0.30 +0.30 
Congo, Rep 0.05 +0.05 Nepal 0.07 +0.07 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.20 +0.20 Nicaragua 0.77 -0.18 
Croatia 0.73 +0.61 Papua N.G. 0.95 +0.95 
El Salvador 0.86 0.00 Rwanda 1.00 +0.73 
Ethiopia 0.00 0.00 Sierra Leone 0.25 +0.25 
Georgia 0.82 -0.11 Sri Lanka 0.02 +0.02 
Guatemala 1.00 +0.09 Tajikistan 0.41 +0.32 
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controls from 199685 to 2013, according to the database published by Jahan and Wang 
(2017) at the IMF.     
The analysis by Lane et al (2003)86 indicates that the global trend of financial 
liberalization using net external assets and liabilities as a percentage of trade has grown 
at an incredible rate, meaning that financial sectors are further integrating.  Based on 
this tendency, one can estimate that for future conflicts, central banks in fragile states 
will see increasingly diminished power in controlling capital flow during crisis periods, 
which implies new challenges that could increase risks of financial institution failure 
during future economic reconstructions.  
 
 
The series of graphs in Figure 2.7 demonstrates a considerably constant pattern 
regarding this study’s sample of 30 conflict-recovering economies.  That is that they 
are trading more, growing more, developing human capital faster and attracting more 
investment than their averaged income peer groups.  One explanation offered for a 
portion of this excess is that firms may find easier restoring or repairing activities rather 
than creating brand new ones, essentially off-setting the dips in productivity during 
conflict with large initial gains post-conflict.  This sudden return of activity is 
confirmed by initial peaks of growth within the first five years of reconstruction on 
average; however, it is doubtful that this alone can explain the continued growth trends 
85 The first date of data availability. 
86 Lane, Philip R. and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria. (2003) “International Financial Integration.” IMF 
Working Paper /03/86.  
Data Source: Lane, 2004 IMF  
Figure 2.6 International Integration: Finance vs Trade 
Data Source: Lane et al (2003) IMF  
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over a prolonged period.  As explained in Section I, markets change due to conflict and 
the post-conflict landscape is highly altered if not entirely different in many cases.  A 
more compelling argument is the role that external developmental aid and increased 
FDI play in bolstering growth and increasing the human development index (HDI) 
value.  Yet for LDCs, increasing ODA (Ifa) shows a negative correlation on economic 
growth (Yg) as seen in Table 2.2, 
due to potential domestic 
production being supplanted by 
free aid that creates challenging 
price distortions.  For the rest of 
the groupings, ODA is better 
converted into long-term growth 
through infrastructure projects 
and much needed external debt-
relief. Still, lingering questions 
over the distribution, allocation, 
and effectiveness of such aid are 
not always clear cut in empirical 
data, and a shadow has been 
recently cast over the debate. As 
Section III discusses, some portions of ODA may actually be borderline ineffective in 
regards to long-term developmental projects depending on their aims.   
While conflict-affected populations have been particularly challenged by inequality as 
previously noted, it is important to highlight that in terms of human development score, 
on average, they are improving faster than the non-conflict average whether from 
developmental assistance, increased foreign investment, or trade openness.  The follow-
on question that will require further analysis is whether these economies maintain their 
unique trajectory, or if, in the process of development, they normalize and fall into step 
with other developing countries.  
A single variable that keeps appearing in each part of this analysis is trade openness.  
Across every income grouping, the common variable is relaxing trade barriers and 
allowing a freer market flow.  In reconstruction, this allows domestic producers to count 
on foreign demand in the midst of vacillating domestic markets and bolsters incentive 
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For OECD countries, financial assistance the primary tool for helping in the long, arduous journey of 
sustainable development in many developing countries.  When programmed correctly, ODA can be a 
powerful driving force that can lift up communities and bolster economic growth.  Yet, there is no 
consensus in Aid Effectiveness Literature (AEL) as to ODA’s role, whether positive or negative in the 
long-term.  This section explores certain inconsistencies that have been found in both distribution and 
allocation of aid immediately post-conflict as well as explores the role of aid-dependency, which can 
lead to economic stagnation.  
As Section I explained, the human capital loss index is useful in evaluating the 
comparative impacts on a population that conflicts can create.  Whether refugees, 
displaced persons, or fatalities, all are exacerbated by the duration of a conflict, which 
perpetuates the continual conflict-originating grievance and tears the social fabric of a 
country.  By conflict end, each of the measured observations’ estimated HCL score 
placed Mozambique, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Bosnia and Cambodia as the top 5 most 
human capital damaging conflicts in the sample, signifying an intense social deficit 
from which reconstruction must begin.   
As a measure of intensity, HCL shows logical relationship with increased recovery 
efforts as seen in Figure 3.1.  That is to say that reconstruction progress as the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (Ypl) and improvement of basic 
services, measured by access to electricity (Aep) and access to water (Awp), are 
positively correlated with the value of HCL at statistically significant levels.  Bubble 
sizes represent HCL value.  Four of the five countries with the highest human capital 
loss grew in their reconstruction processes faster than the average on both axes; the 
SECTION III: Dynamics of Developmental Assistance  
Conflict intensity and developmental assistance 
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exception was Bosnia, which achieved maximum value of 100% Aep and Awp and 
therefore could not improve beyond the average.   
Doyle and Sambanis (2006) found similar results regarding the role of capacities in 
their Peacebuilding Triangle, which estimates peacebuilding success via the utilization 
of three indices: international capacities (IC), local capacities (LC), and hostility (H).   
IC is measured by UN peacekeeping operations statistics and through effective foreign 
assistance; LC includes increases in GDP per capita, primary commodity exports and 
oil-export dependence, and electricity consumption; and H is measured by number of 
actors, ethnic fractionalization, and types of conflict outcomes, which essentially 
measures a de-facto intensity level through historical averages.  The results of this 
analysis demonstrate increased challenges in regards to low amounts of “peace-building 
space” in Timor-Leste and Rwanda where local capacities were devastated, correlating 
with this paper’s HCL index.   
While the average reconstruction of these war-torn economies outpaced, 
proportionally, their respective non-conflict income grouping averages, the most 
stagnant reconstruction observations in Figure 3.1 were Burundi, Chad, and Côte 
d’Ivoire.  Not surprisingly, these three were near bottom in each of the income inputs 
of Table 2.4.  All three relied significantly on mineral exports Cn, received below 
average foreign aid Ifa, were in the bottom third in both the political stability index and 
the capital account openness index, averaged low inflows of FDI as % GDP If of 0.07%, 
1.82% and 1.40% respectively, and actually decreased trade openness To during 
reconstruction by 0.34%, 3.76%, and 9.36% respectively from conflict end to 2014.  
 In these cases, the factors identified as economic growth accelerants in Section II apply 
here, representing examples of how inwardly-orienting economies, when combined 
with poor institutional framework and high rates of poverty, retrogress in development 
goals, essentially rendering reconstruction infeasible, and increasing probabilities of 
future conflict recurrence.  Specifically in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the trend foretold 
a relapse into civil war which it manifested in 2010-2011 as the Second Ivorian War 
due to exacerbated ethnic fractionalization and perceived horizontal inequalities87.  
87 Analysis of the social effects of inequality have yielded separations between two types of 
distribution: vertical (traditional income inequality by population standards) and horizontal 
(disproportionate wealth by ethnolinguistic/religious social groupings).  In the case of tribal feuding, 
the more caustic variable of horizontal inequalities pits social groups at odds with one another and is 
seen as a greater conflict recurrence stimulant than vertical (Gini coefficient) inequality.  See Stewert 
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Another aspect corresponding to aid and human capital loss is the international 
community’s preferential response to those conflicts deemed “worse” than others.  
Since numerous factors regarding aid distribution are calculated by donor countries, 
perceived conflict intensity is not necessarily a prime factor; however, as Figure 3.2 
illustrates using basic OLS, we see strong correlations with both the political stability 
index score at end of conflict88 PST and the human capital loss index HCL on the annual 
average of net ODA received per capita Ifa.  All 30 countries have been time demeaned 
and averaged over the course of the reconstruction period (E: E+15) in order to regress 
both PST and HCL on Ifa as:  
 
In a simplistic, straightforward relationship accounting for no exogenous variables, 
HCL strongly correlates with ODA per capita received Ifa (a theoretical increase of 
$20.63 per capita per percentage of HCL) and political stability follows a similar 
pattern, namely that more politically stable environments under a lesser threat of active 
violence are correlated with more foreign aid received. Chauvet and Guillamont (2013) 
observe this significant negative correlation as well stating that in all regressions in 
their panel analysis, aid is less effective in politically unstable countries.  In practice, 
these results are logical.  Certainly the challenges of directing developmental aid into 
the most desperate regions are evident.  The more tenuous a situation, the higher the 
propensity to have a violent armed faction nearby exerting a monopoly of force.  
International efforts consistently encounter difficulties surpassing these social and 
sometimes violent obstacles. 
Doyle and Sambanis (2007) count different ecologies89 as levels of transitional 
challenges in peacekeeping with the most insurmountable being the fifth, or highest, 
level of hostile and incoherent factions exerting control through violence within a 
state’s territory as seen in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 
reconstruction efforts never materialized due to failures in peacekeeping.  Conversely, 
a reduction in violence and an increase in political stability (an implied strengthening 
of the central government’s monopoly of force, see Section I) allows international aid 
freedom of movement into rural areas and NGOs feel safer by not placing workers at 
88 One of the six measures from the Worldwide Governance Index (WGI) Daniel Kaufmann, Aart 
Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010).  "The Worldwide Governance Indicators : A Summary of 
Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues". World Bank Policy Research  Working Paper No.  5430 
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risk.  Bosnia and Namibia serve as examples of this, noted by extended periods of zero 
battle-related fatalities post-conflict.90   
Threats to security not only prevent effective distribution of aid but also can interrupt 
rebuilding operations in general, and with enough pressure, shift peacekeeping 
personnel from a progressive development role back to a role as active intermediaries 
and security forces.  Côte d’Ivoire experienced this as UNOCI, the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Côte d’Ivoire, frequently saw the dissolution of peace proceedings and 
upticks of violent clashes among factions, essentially stalling reconstruction 
activities91.     
In regard to HCL and foreign aid as seen in Figure 3.2, the greater the loss of human 
life and the greater the displacement of persons, the larger the perceived intensity of a 
given conflict.  While this reasoning is simplistic and perhaps common sense, 
quantitatively supporting this claim is challenging.  As HCL increases, average Ifa 
increases, representing a portion of international community action.  The countries with 
an HCL above 2.0 (14 countries) received on average $89.24 per capita compared to 
the below 2.0 grouping (16 countries) of $62.59.   
Coupled together, we see several examples of HIGH PST and HIGH HCL correlated 
with HIGH Ifa.   Three of the five largest Ifa recipients scored, not coincidentally, in 
the top ten of PST and top five HCL; these were Bosnia, Mozambique, and Timor-Leste 
(3.15, 3.80, 3.22 HCL respectively).  All three were also in the top ten of aid received 
90 According to the PRIO/Uppsala Conflict Data Program online dataset 
91 UN Security Council (2004) S/2004/697 Second report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
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Figure 3.2 Political Stability and HCL on ODA Per Capita (E: E+15) 
Data Source: Kaufman et al (2010), Author’s Calculations 
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as % GNI.  This confirms the linkage of trends of aid flow in that, all variables 
remaining constant, aid flows preferentially to higher conflict intensity levels where 
political stability is being restored.   
 
Aid effectiveness literature (AEL) has centered itself in the past two decades as a focal 
point among economists, arguing in support of different programs and organizations by 
disputing the correlation with economic growth, whether directly from aid inputs or 
indirectly through accumulation of savings and investment as a result of aid.  
Throughout all literature, however, government policy, both good and bad, are deemed 
critical to the outcome of any form of aid.  It can be assumed that any country exiting a 
violent conflict, especially those in this study with large fatalities, will tend to struggle 
with emplacing effective policies and to have those policies enforced in all parts of its 
territory.   
 
If economic reconstruction is not development-as-usual (Del Castillo, 2008), then 
measuring aid effectiveness must be unique in conflict situations also.  Chauvet and 
Guillamont (2013)92 find that aid effectiveness should be defined differently for 
unstable environments.  They show that aid in unstable environments positively 
correlated with economic growth on the condition of strong current economic policies 
or the expectation of improvements in future policies.   On one hand, this relationship 
indicates a positive direction for aid, tangent upon a positive direction of policy-making 
and institutional health.  On the other hand, it dances around the fact that in unstable 
environments where policy frameworks are frequently lacking, aid shows negligible 
relation with economic growth, just as Table 2.4 shows in this study’s estimates.     
 
Numerous economists have evaluated this phenomenon.  Rodrik (1996)93 and Collier 
(2001)94 agree on the hazard of funneling large amounts of aid to countries with poor 
economic institutions and underdeveloped policies and that doing so will likely hamper 
economic growth.  Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) also point out the potentially 
hazardous negative correlation with growth in poor policy environments.  This is 
intuitive in that post-conflict countries tend to be undergoing political or social 
transitions resulting in political and financial structure being altered or even entirely 
abolished and replaced.   
92 Chauvet, Lisa and Guillaumont, Patrick. (2004). “Aid effectiveness in an unstable environment” 
93 Rodrik D. (1996). “Understanding Economic Policy Reform.” Journal of Economic Literature 34(1), 9-41. 
94 Collier P. and Dehn J. (2001). “Aid, Shocks and Growth.” World Bank, Development Research Group 
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This makes recent aid guidelines from both the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda 
additionally challenging for post-conflict countries in that it is directed that aid flows 
shall be channeled through the country’s public financial management and procurement 
systems to assist in financial capacity development in lieu of parallel programs that 
circumvent host nation management.95  Methodologically, this makes sense.  However 
in practice, donors in the midst of economic reconstruction find themselves in a 
dilemma; mountains of econometric analysis shows that increased aid in countries with 
poor institutions may hinder economic growth, but funneling the aid through parallel 
channels may undermine the authority of the recipient’s government.  Recipients desire 
to reduce aid dependency and begin gaining greater control over their own government 
policies.   
 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2007)96 published an astonishing meta-analysis of all aid 
effectiveness literature in recent history, noting significant organizational and personal 
biases in most results.  This challenges the objectivity of previous empirical results that 
evaluate the effectiveness of aid and even calls into question the once-undisputable 
axiom from the Marshall Plan: aid is a positive force for helping a post-conflict country 
in economic reconstruction.  Doucouliagos and Paldam assess that it is likely that out 
of the 104 authors publishing econometric papers on aid effectiveness in their sample, 
the 73 living in the Washington DC area were likely linked to donating organizations, 
including the OECD, where evaluations to improve organizational funding efficiency 
served as the basis for research.  This bias is so palpable in literature that many authors 
will be surprisingly upfront about their allegiances and motives.  For example, Jean-
Claude Berthélemy’s (2006)97 well-crafted argument published in the Swedish 
Economic Policy Review explains how bilateral aid allocation is heavily influenced by 
commercial interests of donor countries; that is, except “for a few Nordic donors.” 
The aid game competes not just in assisting trade linkages as seen in the Aid for Trade 
program, an OECD flagship, but can also be teeming with political motivation, shape 
military and security operations, and, due to the countless non-governmental 
organizations serving as intermediaries, remain relatively unaccounted for by either the 
recipient or donor.  All this leads many critics to argue utilizing T.E. Lawrence’s 
95 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action (2005/2008), OECD 
96 Doucouliagos, Hristos and Paldam, Martin. (2007). “The aid effectiveness literature: The sad results 
of 40 years of research.”   
97 Berthelemy, Jean-Claude. (2006) “Aid allocation: Comparing donor’s behavior” Swedish Economic 
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dictum, that “it is better for them to do it than to try to do it better for them,” as Del 
Castillo (2012)98 points out.   
Another concept that potentially sways mainstream understanding of the issue is that at 
the core of developmental assistance funds are usually good intentions.  Simply put, we 
want aid to be effective.  Sometimes it may be the only action a richer country can take.  
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2007) note that either from almost any organizational bias, 
or from the human nature standpoint of wanting to do good for people who are 
suffering, the act of publishing papers that show negative correlations or ineffectiveness 
of foreign aid, is journalistic self-damnation.  Whether or not it is true seems to be less 
relevant. 
As ODA is the international community’s primary mechanism for achieving 
developmental goals in poorer countries, as articulated by Haynes and Scott (2013), it 
must also be measured in the very unique context of economic reconstruction.    
Orientations of aid both by population and by sector have been noted as inefficient in 
stimulating much-needed economic growth in low-income countries emerging from 
conflict.  
First, the orientation of aid flows has been inefficient in terms of both country targeting 
and aid per capita.  This is noted by post-conflict cases of Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, 
and Timor-Leste, who received the highest aid per capita ratio during the reconstruction 
period, yet none are considered a least developed country.  This is a frequent sticking 
point addressed by the UN, namely that directing aid towards small percentages of 
populations living in poverty in countries not considered to be extremely poor is 
ineffective at reducing overall poverty.99  Regarding macro-level orientation, ODA has 
largely been ineffective in reducing poverty globally.  Using proportional poverty 
defined by persons living in poverty as a percentage of total population, Strawson and 
Lonsdale (2015) magnify the discrepancy: 
There are 20 countries where ODA is less than US$100 per 
poor person per year (27 US Cents per day); these 20 
countries account for over three-quarters of the world’s 
poor. Conversely, ODA exceeds US$1,000 per poor person 
98 Del Castillo, Graciana. (2012) “Rebuilding war-torn states: tomorrow’s challenges for post-conflict 
reconstruction.” Australian Civil-Military Centre, Paper 04/2012. 
99 Strawson, Tim; Lonsdale, Cordelia (2015) “Improving ODA Allocation for a Post-2015 World,” 
UNDESA, UKAID and ECOSOC, United Nations. 
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in 33 countries, yet these countries account for less than 1% 
of the world’s poor. 
In this sample of post-conflict countries, net ODA received (Ifa) as a percentage of GNI 
is inversely proportional to the level of development.  This is a positive statistic, and 
used frequently in analysis of aid programs.  Year average ODA received as percentage 
of GNI, and not per capita, from end (E) of conflict to E+15 for LICs (23.5%), LMICs 
(7.7%), UMICs (4.66%), had traditionally been thought of as the demonstration that 
international donors’ efforts are responsive to the immediate developmental need as 
seen in Figure 3.3.  LICs over time would transition from immediate assistance to 
steady-state flows of developmental aid, while both LMICs and UMICs appear to have 
the welfare tap slowly tightened over time.  However, these statistics can be better 
explained by a simple concept - that the annual GDP of an average low-middle income 
country is 8 times the output of LICs, and that of upper-middle income countries, 27 
times the output.  As % of GNI, the dollar amounts of aid are therefore misleading.   
When placed in terms of ODA received per capita, UMICs initially receive the largest 
amounts of aid per capita during the first two years post-conflict and then LMICs 
successively are invested in over time by donor countries, resulting in large per capita 
aid receipts.  Both conflict-affected LMICs and UMICs received significantly more 
than LICs in per capita aid received.  For conflict-recovering UMICs, averaging a 
smaller population of 3.9 million per country, the high per capita ratio is easily 
explained.  For conflict-recovering LMICs, however, the average country population is 
21.6 million compared to the LICs’ 13.9 million, yet LMIC citizens indirectly receive 
far more than their poorer counterparts, $140 per capita compared to $70.2 in the most 
drastic year of reconstruction of E+11. 
Numerous theoretical explanations can be offered for the LMIC tendencies, but the 
most apparent is a combination of three overarching factors - overall economic growth, 






















































Figure 3.3 Net ODA Received as % GNI (left) and US $ Per Capita (right) (E: E15)  






















Current and projected distributions by sector, largely influenced by the sustainable 
development goals, may inadvertently exacerbate stalled economic growth, thereby 
increasing risk of conflict recurrence.   As Figure 3.4 illustrates, sector distortions 
appear in regards to LICs in general, where over 12% of assistance received is 
designated as humanitarian aid while infrastructure investment represents only 13% of 
allocation, barely half of other income groupings (22% and 21%).   
The focus of allocation to relieve immediate suffering, and address sub-standard or non-
existent medical capabilities, in LICs is recognized as an imminent priority.  The issue 
emerges when less-accountable cash distributions from emergency funds fail to 
transition into structured financial flows through the public management system of a 
host country.  Essentially this tendency of re-approving humanitarian flows during the 
early stages of reconstruction rather than forecasting structured development plans 
beyond E+5 can delay meaningful economic investment.  
While forcible displacement patterns, according to the UNHCR database, reveal that 
relocation of displaced persons can average between 2-5 years if relocation even occurs 
at all, and basic services can languish and become restored to pre-conflict levels after 
several years of reconstruction.  Therefore the majority of humanitarian aid beyond 
E+4/5 is not necessarily contributing to an economic reconstruction, per se, but to other 
objectives, like parallel projects against poverty or food assistance programs as 
humanitarian relief.  This is seen as a particular trend in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the 
Figure 3.4 ODA Allocations by Sector 
Source: Strawson and Lonsdale (2015) 
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majority of post-conflict developing countries have greater rates of multidimensional 
poverty and lower rates of access to water and electricity.   
 
The argument can be made that significant levels of humanitarian aid beyond E+5 is 
only a temporary relief of symptoms rather than applying a solution to the systemic 
causes of inequalities and lack of social services provided by the central government.  
According to Figures 3.5 and 3.6, the majority of humanitarian aid-dependent countries, 
defined in this paper as those countries that have maintained a greater than 5% 
humanitarian aid to total ODA ratio through E+10, appear to experience inefficient 
programming of developmental aid that could be better destined to building host nation 
capacities.  Del Castillo (2008) identifies the systemic risk of aid not transitioning to 
build sustainable private sector entrepreneurship and holding an over-reliance on 
humanitarian aid, which ultimately discourages domestic production.   
Ethiopia, whose average humanitarian assistance allocation was 20.5% of total ODA 
from 2005-2010 (E+4 to E+9), encountered continually elevated levels of emergency 
food assistance at 79.87% of total humanitarian aid assistance during the same period.  
While Ethiopia managed an estimated 107,000 refugees100 during the period, 
emergency funds were undoubtedly needed; however as time passed, questions have 
loomed over the efficiency of programming as the max number of refugees only 
represented one-tenth of one percent of the population (.0012). During the course of 
reconstruction and development from 2001 to 2014, Ethiopia received, on average, 
humanitarian assistance equal to 2 – 5% of nominal GDP.  Others follow this pattern 
as well in Africa as seen in Figure 3.4.  This inefficiency is plagued by two key notions 
- the value of capital formation in the process of economic recovery and the long-term 
benefits of raising an economy’s aggregate demand.  In both cases, humanitarian 























































































Sierra Leone  



























                                                     
 
BRANDON: CHALLENGES TO ECONOMIC GROWTH IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
assistance, when outside the scope of its original design,101 potentially can hamper 
reconstruction efforts.  Consumables do nothing to increase fixed capital formation or 
productive capacity, nor do they raise aggregate demand as NGOs bypass the 
channeling of funding through the central government, thereby satisfying needs through 
a parallel economy.       
A surprising detail that surfaced when compiling the data for the Human Capital Loss 
index is that the majority of countries which proportionally experienced higher amounts 
of human suffering during conflict, either through direct and indirect deaths, 
displacements, or refugees, were not considered humanitarian aid-dependent post-
conflict (Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Guatemala, Lebanon, Timor-Leste) in 
comparison to other conflicts in the sample.   
If the impact of deaths and displacement is a foundational aspect of measuring how the 
international community should respond, higher correspondence between human 
suffering from conflict and receipt of humanitarian aid should exist in the sample.  
While HCL has a significant, positive relationship with receiving ODA in general, 
especially within the first few years of reconstruction, it shows a negative correlation 
with the subset of humanitarian aid, indicating that human suffering may have less to 
do with aid allocation than is generally thought.  Several examples point towards 
increased spending in infrastructure – Mozambique experienced near 40% destruction 
of fixed capital in agriculture, communication, and administrative sectors, while Timor-
Leste saw more than two-thirds of all infrastructure demolished after the independence 
referendum of 1999.102  
Official development assistance certainly should be shifted toward longer-term 
investment strategies during the reconstruction process.  Humanitarian aid and 
consumables can only be temporarily sufficient as they do little to contribute to the 
much-needed economic growth during the course of reconstruction.  Programming 
priorities are set by donor countries, and an emphasis should be renewed in 
reestablishing and improving infrastructure and basic services through both public and 
private channels. 
101 OECD utilizes “short-term” and “emergency” in all the subordinate code definitions of 
humanitarian assistance and even states in 730: “Longer-term activities to improve the level of 
infrastructure or social services should be reported under the relevant economic and social sector 
codes” http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/humanitarian-assistance.htm   
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Clearly the goal of stimulating growth as part of comprehensive economic 
reconstruction is an evident necessity both to prevent conflict recurrence and to support 
the healthy restoration of lost GDP and lost human capital.  Trade openness has proven 
in this study to be a catalyst for growth, and it carries with it inherent risks of increased 
short-term income inequality, contrary to the aims of the UN’s sustainable development 
goals.  Though in terms of short-term surges of economic activity that greatly reduces 
violence recurrence and preventing further loss of human life, increased trade openness 
in post-conflict countries is a vital tool that must be employed.  From a global 
perspective, liberalization is a power on its own, growing every year in conflict and 
non-conflict countries alike – a tendency that cannot be ignored when deciding the best 
means to stimulate post-conflict growth.  The continued oversight and emphasis of “fair 
trade” by investing firms will be vital to avoid aggravated levels of a naturally rising 
income inequality, and aggressive rent-seeking through extractive industries must be 
curtailed through international oversight.  An additional requirement will exist in future 
for economic reconstruction scenarios to shield (not insulate) war-torn countries from 
asymmetric shocks in the financial sector, as international financial integration continue 
to deepen.   
The effects and allocation of official development assistance must be reevaluated as 
long-term economic growth can be hindered by improper programming.  Additionally, 
if donors are reorienting aid to combat poverty, the current distributions of net ODA 
per capita in conflict recovering countries must be adjusted as the current distribution 
is grossly unbalanced between poor and richer countries.  Finally, human capital loss, 
as a calculation, will require further refinement to be applicable to other conflicts 
outside this sample, and hopefully, with drastic increases in technology and 
communication in the past decade, migration and death reporting will improve globally, 

















Alesina, Alberto and Rodrik, Dani. (1994). “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 109, Issue 2.   
Allen, Mark. (2005). “Review of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines” IMF. 
Azam, Jean-Paul. (2008). “Macroeconomic Agenda for Fiscal Policy and Aid Effectiveness in 
Post-Conflict.” Draft, Toulouse School of Economics. 
Barro, R.J. (2000). “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries” Journal of Economic 
Growth 5: 5. 
Bénabou, Rolan. (1996). “Inequality and Growth,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, 
Volume 11.  
Benhabib, Jess; Rustichini, Aldo. (1996). “Social Conflict Growth.” Journal of Economic 
Growth vol. 1, issue 1.   
Bhagwati, Jagdish. (2004). “In Defense of Globalization” Oxford University Press. 
Blattman Christopher; Miguel, Edward. (2008). “Civil War” Journal of Economic Literature 
48 (1): 3-57 
Braithwaite, John; Charlesworth, Hilary; Reddy, Peter; Dunn, Leah. (2010). “Reconciliation 
and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in Bougainville.” ANU Press. 
Calic, Marie-Janine. (2013). “Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes 1991-1995,” pages 114-153 
in “Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars initiative,” edited by Ingrao, Charles 
and Emmert, Thomas A, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2013, Purdue University. 
Chauvet, Lisa and Guillaumont, Patrick. (2004). “Aid effectiveness in an unstable 
environment” 
Cingano, F. (2014). “Trends in Income Inequality and Its Impact on Economic Growth", 
OECD SEM Working Paper No. 163.   
Collier, Paul; Heffler, Anke. (2000). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” World Bank 
Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper 2355. 
Colucci, Lamont. (2015). “Great Power Conflict: Will It Return?” World Affairs, January 
2015. 
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea. (2017). “An econometric analysis of the bifurcation of within-
country inequality trends in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2011” UNDP, Regional Bureau for 
Africa. UNDP-RBA/WPS 4/2016.  
Costello, Patrick. (1995). “Guatemala: Displacement, Return and the Peace Process.” 
REFWORLD 
Crocker, Chester A.; Hampson, Fen Osler; Aall, Pamela. (2007). Leashing the Dogs of War: 
Conflict Management in a Divided World United States Institute of Peace Press.  
Darvas, Zsolt. (2012). “Real effective exchange rates for 178 countries: A new database.” 
Working Paper 2012/06, Bruegel. 
De Long, Bradford; Eichengreen, Barry. (1991). “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most 





BRANDON: CHALLENGES TO ECONOMIC GROWTH IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
Del Castillo, Graciana. (2008). “Economic Reconstruction of War-Torn Countries: The Role 
of the International Financial Institutions” Seton Hall Law Review Vol. 38:1265. 
Del Castillo, Graciana. (2012) “Rebuilding war-torn states: tomorrow’s challenges for post-
conflict reconstruction.” Australian Civil-Military Centre, Paper 04/2012. 
Del Castillo, Graciana. (2015). “Economic Reconstruction and Reforms in Post-Conflict 
Countries” Centre for Research on Peace and Development, Working Paper 25. 
Dessalegn, Bezaiet. (2004). “FMO Country Guides.” ForcedMigration.org.  
Doucouliagos, Hristos and Paldam, Martin. (2007). “The aid effectiveness literature: The sad 
results of 40 years of research.”   
Doyle, M., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and 
Quantitative Analysis. American Political Science Review, 94(4), 779-801. 
Doyle, Michael W.; Sambanis, Nicholas. (2006). Making War and Building Peace: United 
Nations Peace Operations. Princeton University Press. 
Eck, Kristine; Hultman, Lisa. (2007). “Violence Against Civilians in War,” Journal of Peace 
Research 44 
Eichengreen, Marc, Crafts, and Hellwig. (1992). “The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and 
Implications for Eastern Europe and the Former USSR.” Economic Policy, 7(14). 
Etsy, Daniel; Goldstone, Jack; Gurr, T. R.; Harff, Barbara; Surko, Pamela T.; Unger, Alan N.; 
and Chen, Robert. (1998). "Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and 
Consequences” The State Failure Project, United States Government. 
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). “Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war” American 
political science review, 97(1), 75-90. 
Forbes, Kristin J. (2000). “A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Inequality and 
Growth.” American economic review 90.4: 869-887.   
Gersovitz, Mark; Kriger, Norma. (2013). “What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its 
Definition and Econometric Consequences” The World Bank Research Observer Vol. 
28:159–190. 
Gleditsch, N. P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand. (2002). “Armed 
Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 39:615–37.  
Goovaerts P; Gasser M; Belman Inbal A. (2005). “Demand Driven Approaches to Livelihood 
Support in Post-War Contexts” ILO, World Bank. 
Grossman, Dave. (1995). On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and 
Society. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Howard, Caroline. (2014). “Indonesia: Durable solutions needed for protracted IDPs as new 
displacement occurs in Papua.” IDMC access by REFWORLD. 
Human Rights Watch. (1992). “Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine, and the Reform 
Process in Mozambique,” Africa Watch Report.  HCR. 
Human Rights Watch. (2009). “Cambodia: 30 Years After Fall of the Khmer Rouge, Justice 
Still Elusive” 




BRANDON: CHALLENGES TO ECONOMIC GROWTH IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
Kaldor, Nicholas. (1957). “A model of economic growth.” Economic Journal 57. 
Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo. (2010). "The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues" World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No.  5430.  
Kreutz, Joakim. (2010). “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP 
Conflict Termination Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 47(2): 243-250. 
Kuznets, Simon. (1955). “Economic growth and income inequality.” American Economic 
Review 45.  
Lacina, Bethany and Gleditsch, Nils Petter. (2005). “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A 
New Dataset of Battle Deaths.” European Journal of Population: 21(2–3): 145–166. 
Lacina, Bethany. (2009). “The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946-2008, Version 3.0 
Documentation of Coding Decisions,” CSCW/PRIO. 
Lane, Philip R. and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria. (2003). “International Financial Integration.” 
IMF Working Paper /03/86.  
Lane, Philip R. and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria. (2007) (2014). "The External Wealth of 
Nations Mark II", Journal of International Economics, November 2007 WP/06/69. Updated in 
2014. 
Leitenberg, Milton. (2006). Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century. Cornell 
University, Peace Studies Program. 
Liga Moçambicana Dos Direitos Humanos. (2003). “Torturas, tratamento degradante e 
execuções sumárias.” IESE. 
Lim, Guay C. and McNellis, Paul D.  (2014). “Income Inequality, Trade and Financial 
Openness.” International Monetary Fund.   
Mack, Andrew. (2007). “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline.” 
International Peace Academy. 
Mack, Andrew; Mertz, Sebastian; Bui, Mai; Cooper, Tara; Echlin, Gwen; Gray, John 
Laidlaw; Harris, Kala; Ridgeway, Lindsey. (2012). “Human Security Report 2012,” Human 
Security Research Group. School for International Studies. 
Markovits, Daniel; Strange, Austin; Tingley, Dustin. (2017). “Foreign Aid and the Status 
Quo: Evidence from Pre-Marshall Plan Aid” Harvard School of Government. 
Milanovic, Branka. (2005). “Measuring International and Global Inequality.” Princeton 
University Press. 
Mishra, Prachi and Montiel, Peter. (2014). “How Effective Is Monetary Transmission in Low-
Income Countries? A Survey of the Empirical Evidence.” IMF Working Paper/12/143. 
Nielsen, Jens; Jensen, Henrik; Andersen, Per Kragh; Aaby, Peter. (2006) “Mortality patterns 
during a war in Guinea-Bissau 1998–99: changes in risk factors?” International Journal of 
Epidemiology, Volume 35, Issue 2:438–446. 
OECD. (2015). “Development Co-operation Report 2015” Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). 
öglund, Kristine H and Orjuela, Camilla. (2011). “Winning the Peace: conflict and prevention 





BRANDON: CHALLENGES TO ECONOMIC GROWTH IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
Ohiorhenuan, John F.E.; Stewart, Frances (2008) “Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: 
Enabling Local Ingenuity” United Nations Development Programme. 
Rajan and Subramanian. (2009). “Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth” Journal of 
Development Economics 94 (2011) 106–118.  
Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo. (2006). “Transitional Justice in Post-Yugoslav 
Countries” 
Rodrik D. (1996). “Understanding Economic Policy Reform.” Journal of Economic Literature 
34(1), 9-41. 
Sambanis, Nicholas. (2001). “A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the 
Quantitative Literature of on Civil War,” Defence and Peace Economics, 13:3, 215-243. 
Stiglitz, Joseph. (2002). “Globalization and its Discontents” W. W. Norton & Company. 
Strawson, Tim; Lonsdale, Cordelia (2015) “Improving ODA Allocation for a Post-2015 
World,” UNDESA, UKAID and ECOSOC, United Nations. 
Trowbridge, Erin. (2002).  “Back Road Reckoning” Dissent 49, 101-11. 
Tucker, Spencer. (2016). “The Roots and Consequences of 20th-Century Warfare: Conflicts 
That Shaped the Modern World.” ABC-CLIO 
U.S. National Security Strategy. (2017). 
UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 628 (1989), 16 January 1989 
UNESCO. (2007). “Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational 
Frameworks in South-East Asia.” 
UNHCR. (2005). “UNHCR Country Operations Plan 2006 - Timor-Leste,” 1 September 
2005. 
United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. (2002). “U.S. Committee for 
Refugees World Refugee Survey 2002 - Congo-Brazzaville,” 10 June 2002. REFWORLD. 
USAID. (2009). “A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries” Bureau for 
Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade, US Agency for International Development. 
Verbeek M.; Nijman, T. (1996). “Incomplete Panels and Selection Bias.” The Econometrics 
of Panel Data. Advanced Studies in Theoretical and Applied Econometrics, vol 33. 
Vicenç Fisas. (2009). “Anuario Procesos de Paz.” Icaria editorial / Escola de Cultura de Pau, 
UAB. 
Von Clausewitz, Carl. 1940. On war. Jazzybee Verlag. 
Wang, Jahan. (2017). “Capital Account Openness.” IMF. 
Way, Catherine. (2015). “UN’s Millennium Development Goals Report 2017.” United 
Nations 
Weber. (1919). “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society, ed. By 
Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters. Palgrave Macmillan. 2015. 
Woodbury, Jo. (2015). “The Bougainville independence referendum: Assessing the risks and 





BRANDON: CHALLENGES TO ECONOMIC GROWTH IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
World Bank Group. (2011). “World Development Report.” Global Center on Conflict, 
Security and Development, World Bank Group. 
 
Datasets 
Publicly Accessible Datasets 
 
-Human Development Index, United Nations Development Programme 
-Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, World Bank 
-OECD Stat, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
-World Development Indicators, World Bank  
-Population Statistics Database, UN High Commissioner for Refugees  
-Trade Statistics Database, UN Conference on Trade and Development 
-International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
-UNSTAT, UN Statistical Division 
-Displacement Data, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre  
-Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2018 
-CrisisWatch Database (2018) International Crisis Group 
-Migration Database, Forcedmigration.org 
 
Additional Datasets Utilized 
 
Darvas, Zsolt. (2012). “Real effective exchange rates for 178 countries: A new database.” 
Working Paper 2012/06, Bruegel 
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). “Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war” American 
political science review, 97(1), 75-90. 
Gleditsch, N. P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand. (2002). “Armed 
Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 39:615–37. 
Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo. (2010). "The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues" World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No.  5430.  
Kreutz, Joakim. (2010). “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP 
Conflict Termination Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 47(2): 243-250. 
Lane, Philip R. and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, (2007) (2014). "The External Wealth of 
Nations Mark II", Journal of International Economics, November 2007 WP/06/69. Updated in 
2014. 
Leitenberg, Milton. (2006). Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century. Cornell 
University, Peace Studies Program. 
Wang, Jahan. (2017). “Capital Account Openness.” IMF. 
 
 
—65— 
 
 
 
